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Decreases in the manufacturing productivity growth rate,
rising weapon systems costs, and the decline of the defense
industrial base are major interrelated problems currently
facing the Department of Defense (DOD) . The Industrial
Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP) is a DOD capital
investment incentive plan designed to help alleviate these
problems. The objective of this research is to trace the
historical elements of the IMIP, provide an analysis of the
IMIP and the actions that have been taken to implement it,
and to advance recommendations regarding the IMIP for
consideration during the Program test period.
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I. THE INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION INCENTIVES PROGRAM
A. RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY
Productivity, or rather the decline in the rate of pro-
ductivity increase, and its associated consequences to the
nation have become a major focus of attention in the Govern-
ment. The decline in productivity growth has been attributed
to many factors. Considered to be the prime contributors
are low rates of capital investment, the general economic
condition of the nation, and the effects of international
competition.
The Department of Defense (DOD) , the largest purchaser of
capital equipment in the Federal Government, is concerned
with declining productivity because it is considered to be
one of the driving forces in the rapidly rising costs of DOD
acquisitions. In an attempt to halt the decline in produc-
tivity, the DOD has instituted a program that is intended to
increase the rate of capital investment by defense contrac-
tors. This program, the Industrial Modernization Incentives
Program (IMIP) , is designed to encourage contractor capital
investments to enhance productivity by offering several in-
centives to contractors and removing or mitigating some
existing disincentives to contracting with the DOD.
B. RESEARCH METHODS
The research methodology of the paper covers a broad
spectrum. In most cases, primary source documents, some of
8

which have yet to be officially released or published, were
utilized. At other times, such as when researching the his-
torical aspects of the IMIP, secondary source documents were
relied on. Data were collected directly in personal and
telephone interviews with IMIP representatives of the Air
Force, Army, Navy, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) , and Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . Also, a meeting of
the tri-service team assigned to implement the IMIP was at-
tended. Technical assistance in the areas of economic theory
and cost accounting was obtained from the Logistics Manage-
ment Institute (LMI) and the staff of the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS)
.
C. KEY AREAS OF THE PAPER
Chapter II is a detailed review of the measures taken by
the DOD authorizing the IMIP and how the goals of this au-
thorization have been embodied in a more detailed instruction
and guide. Chapter III provides the status of the IMIP
implementation by addressing, among other areas, the topics
of IMIP Guidance, IMIP Funding, and new IMIP partnerships.
Chapter IV is an historical presentation tracing chronologi-
cal development from three perspectives: the decline in pro-
ductivity growth; the rise in weapon systems costs; and the
decline in the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) . Each perspec-
tive is clarified by presenting historical data and discussion
on the significance of that perspective to the development
of the IMIP. Chapter V is an analysis of the current goal

attainment status of the IMIP, its benefits to the DOD and
the contractors, and some potential disadvantages. Recom-




II. FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
MODERNIZATION INCENTIVES PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP) is
sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as
a tri-service effort to improve the productivity of the DIB.
The IMIP is intended to meet this goal by providing incen-
tives to the contractors for improvements in manufacturing
plants and processes. Such improvements are intended to
benefit the Government by fostering a modern industrial base
and more economical production. This chapter will review in
detail the measures taken by the DOD authorizing this tri-
service effort and how the goals of this authorization have
been embodied in more detailed IMIP authorizations and
objectives
.
B. AUTHORIZATION OF THE IMIP
A test period of the IMIP was authorized on 2 November
1982 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense with the stated goal
of supporting the DOD Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP)
Initiative Number Five, "Encourage Capital Investment to
Enhance Productivity." The objectives, documentation,
program structure, authority, limitations, test conditions,
and issues of the test were stipulated in the IMIP charter
and were included as an enclosure to the authorizing letter.
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The authorizing letter requested that the Navy allow Rear
Admiral J.S. Sansone, SC, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Material
for Contracts and Business Management, to serve as the initial
chairman of the IMIP Steering Group to be formed under the
Charter. It also named Dr. Richard A. Stimson of the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineer-
ing (Acquisition Management) as the Office of the Secretary of
Defense representative and requested that each of the services
and the DLA nominate a senior representative and alternate
to the steering group. The conclusion of the letter of authori-
zation was that, during the test period, proposed IMIP policy
would be coordinated within the DOD and with industry. Also,
specific recommendations for changes to the Defense Acquisi-
tions Regulations (DAR) to support the program should be de-
fined and the proposed IMIP policy should be developed further.
C. IMIP TEST CHARTER
The IMIP Test Charter states that the DOD is not yet in
a position to propose the specific DAR changes required to
improve productivity and that,
The test is being initiated with the objective being
to develop and submit specific recommendations for
changes to the DAR and improvements to IMIP policy.
At the completion of the Program, a formal DOD IMIP
instruction will be issued. [Ref . 1: p. 1]
Improving productivity is viewed as being contingent on two
factors: providing incentives for contractors to modernize
their facilities and removing impediments or disincentives
12

for reduced unit costs on major capital investments. One
disincentive specifically identified by the Charter is,
The policy and practice of pricing contracts on the
basis of costs expected to be incurred—any signifi-
cant reduction in the costs of performance will cause
a related reduction in negotiated profits.
[Ref. 1: p. 1J
Another identified disincentive was linked to DAR 3-815
which describes a procedure for the government to accept
some risks of program failure (defined as severe reduction
in scope or termination of the program) in order to encour-
age contractor investment in severable plant equipment (that
equipment which can be moved with a reasonable amount of
effort) . According to the Charter,
The present application of DAR 3-815 to only severable
plant equipment further diminishes DOD ' s ability to
encourage contractor investment in necessary capital
assets. [Ref. 1: p. 1]
The formation of an IMIP Steering Group and a Support
Team is directed by the Charter. Tasks assigned to the
Steering Group include the general monitoring of the conduct
and results of the test program, as well as the more specif-
ic jobs of defining the time and scope of the test program,
addressing the issue of funding, monitoring contingent lia-
bilities, and, where more than one DOD component is involved,
assisting in preparing the Memoranudm of Understanding (MOU)
for the IMIP contract. The Support Team is charged with pro-
viding assistance to program and acquisition managers and to
industry; conducting seminars and training; preparing and
implementing DOD Component IMIP instructions for contracting,
13

technical, and financial matters; functioning as the focal
point for coordination for joint interservice IMIPs; and
maintaining a file on IMIP programs and results.
Two key documents relating to the IMIP are listed by the
Charter for evaluation during the test. These documents,
the draft DOD Instruction 5000. XX, "Industrial Modernization
Incentives Program," and the draft DOD Guide "Improving
Productivity in Defense Contracting" are directed by the
Charter to be made available to appropriate Government and
industry personnel and modified or added to during the test
period based on the circumstances of the acquisitions
concerned.
The usual procedures for obtaining DAR deviations are
outlined in DAR 1-108 and DAR 1-109. For the purposes of the
test, the Charter authorizes a blanket waiver to DAR 1-108
and DAR 1-109 and establishes controls to be used to proto-
type capital investment incentive changes, and to agreed
field test changes. The procedure stipulated is that the
standard DAR case format should be used for requests for
deviations which may be approved by the Head of Contracting
Activity (HCA) unless the request involves major policy
issues in areas other than capital investment incentives
or the request will affect more than one contract. In cases
regarding non-capital investment incentive areas, the appro-
val of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
Management) (DUSD(AM)) will be required. For requests for
deviations that will affect more than one contract, Steering
14

Group approval will be required. In all cases, the Steering
Group will be appraised of all deviations granted, the DUSD(AM)
will be appraised of all deviation activity by the OSD
representative on the Steering Group and the DAR Council
will be provided copies of all deviations. The Charter
does not change DAR 3-815(D) (2) (ii), the provision requiring
high-level approval of contingent liabilities, or the re-
quirement that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and
Engineering) be notified prior to contract signature on a
contract contingent upon future production with a liability
of ten million dollars or more.
Under the test conditions stipulated by the Charter,
Contractors will have the opportunity to share in
the Government's savings through the use of sharing
arrangements or on a percentage basis, through a return
on investment (ROI) approach, or through other appro-
priate approaches. In addition, the Government's
assumption of risk for program failure would not be
limited to severable plant equipment and could include
investments for non-severable assets. [Ref. 1: p. 3]
The selection of programs for the test will be based
on the factors described in the proposed DOD Instruction
5000.XX and the estimated potential for cost savings by
the government. The proposed Charter criteria for the
selection of contractors' proposals are as follows:
1. The investment would not be made, but for the
government's agreement to share benefits and
accept certain risks,
2. There is a reasonable expectation that adoption
of the proposal will result in a substantial
savings to the government through lower unit
15

production cost or that other benefits as stated in
proposed DOD Instruction 5000. XX will result,
3. There is a reasonable expectation that funds will
be available to procure the projected quantities.
4. The investment should primarily support enhanced
production efficiency of an existing or antici-
pated operation, not new production capacity, and
5. The investment will have desirable benefits in
other areas such as industrial preparedness.
[Ref. 1: p. 3]
The conditions of the test further stipulate IMIP-specif ic
information that should be included in the contractor's
proposal. The additional contractor proposal information
required by the Charter is as follows:
1. Identification of assets to be acquired by the
contractor,
2. Identification of items to be produced,
3. Description of the differences between the contrac-
tor's production methods with and without the
proposed investment,
4. Detailed cost estimates for the existing contract
requirements and the proposal,
5. Analysis of effects of learning, variations of
quantities, changes to make-or-buy plans, subcon-
tracting, labor contract agreements, and other similar
factors, and
6. Suggested business arrangement describing government
and contractor benefit sharing over existing and
future contracts and the time frame for acceptance
of the proposal. [Ref. 1: p. 4
J
D. PROPOSED DOD IMIP INSTRUCTION
The purpose of the "DOD Industrial Modernization
Incentives Program," DOD Instruction 5000. XX, is,
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To establish the Industrial Modernization Incentives
Program. This program will help focus contractor
resources on industrial modernization. It will help
support the development of more efficient production
capability for weapon systems, equipment and material.
The Industrial Modernization Incentives Program encom-
passes and expands on existing service programs referred
to as Technology Modernization and Industrial Produc-
tivity, sets policy, assigns responsibilities, and
prescribes procedures. [Ref. 2: p. 1]
From this quote, it is apparent that the purpose of the
IMIP is to motivate contractors to make capital investments
to upgrade equipment or plant on the assumption that so
doing will result in improved manufacturing efficiency and
reductions in weapon systems costs.
The proposed Instruction addresses several IMIP policy
topics. The topics cover these areas: motivation of indus-
try toward the Government's goals in this area; inclusion
of the IMIP in overall acquisition strategy where applica-
ble; and contractor investment (and if necessary, Government
funding of IMIP implementation) . Of these topics, that of
motivating industry is addressed in the greatest detail.
Toward the goal of motivating industry to take actions
that should result in improved productivity, the proposed
Instruction indicates that industry should be motivated to:
1. Invest in improved processes, methods, techniques,
facilities and equipment, software and organiza-
tion (s), including the improved utilization of human
resources, for the most efficient and economical
production of quality defense weapon systems,
equipment, and material;
2. Improve its productivity and responsiveness includ-
ing prime contractors, subcontractors, and vendors;




4. Reduce lead time and increase the surge and mobili-
zation capability of industry;
5. Accelerate implementation of advanced manufacturing
technology, and provide maximum distribution of
results;
6. Improve product quality and reliability as a function
of the manufacturing process; and
7. Implement manufacturing systems improvements based
on a long term perspective and plant-wide total
systems analysis. [Ref. 2: p. 2]
The proposed instruction assigns IMIP responsibilities
to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineer-
ing (USDR&E) , to the Heads of DOD Components, and to DCD
component acquisition and program managers. The USDR&E is
tasked with two general responsibilities. The first is to
ensure that IMIP policy and procedures are consistent with
the goals and objectives relating to production and opera-
tional readiness, weapon systems acquisition, production
management, and industrial preparedness. The second is,
To coordinate with Congress, the DAR Council, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , and
others, as necessary, to make effective changes to the
statutes or regulations so that the IMIP may provide
maximum benefits to the DOD. [Ref. 2: p. 3]
The responsibilities assigned to the Heads of DOD Components
are more specific than those assigned to the USDR&E. Heads
of DOD Components are responsible for ensuring that:
1. The assessment of the IMIP is in accordance with
DOD Instruction 4 200.15, "Manufacturing Technology
Program," DOD Instruction 5000.2, "Major System
Acquisition Procedures," DOD Directive 5000.1, "Major
Systems Acquisitions," and DOD Directive 50 00.34,
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"Defense Production Management" by the proper plan-
ning, programming and budgeting of acquisitions;
2. IMIP is coordinated effectively within and among
DOD components by establishing procedures for that
purpose;
3. IMIP implementation is evaluated with a view to its
effectiveness
;
4. Contingent liability financing that may result from
implementing IMIP is planned;
5. IMIP is understood and implemented at the working
level by in-house training programs and by courses
at schools under the control of the DOD Components
and
6. Advanced manufacturing technologies are reflected
in the IMIP initiatives.
The responsibilities assigned to the DOD Component acquisi-
tion and program managers are the most detailed of those
assigned to the three groups. Acquisition and program
managers are directed by the proposed Instruction to:
1. Ensure that IMIP opportunities are addressed in
program documentation to include master program
plans and supporting budget plans, acquisition plans
and strategies, and source selection plans,
2. Include IMIP requirements in procurement or purchase
requests for weapon systems, equipment, and material,
when it is the best interest of the government,
3. Ensure that verifiable evaluation criteria, measuring
tangible cost savings and benefits accrued from the
IMIP projects, are established at the time of initia-
tion, and that they are used to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the IMIP projects, when implemented, and
19

4. Act as the lead for IMIP initiatives, as mutually
agreed, where more than one DOD Component acquisition
or program manager is doing IMIP business with a
contractor, or providing individual DOD Component
IMIP requirements for inclusion when another DOD
Component acquisition or program manager is the lead
for the initiative. [Ref. 2: p. 4]
Nine specific procedures are presented in the proposed
instruction. The procedures deal with planning for the use
of IMIP, the approach to the plan, contracting, validating
savings and benefits, funding, contractor investment pro-
tection, the incentives to be used, the contractor's cash
flow, and technology transfer.
Planning is to be utilized for maximum effectiveness and
should consider the IMIP early in the acquisition cycle.
Normally, this consideration should be part of the
industrial resources analysis required to support
Milestones I and II for major weapons system acquisi-
tion. The IMIP, however, shall also be considered early
in the acquisition process in other non-major systems
acquisitions. This does not preclude implementing an
IMIP when the acquisition cycle is at a more advanced
stage. [Ref. 2: p. 4]
The approach to the plan should be in accordance with
the size, scope, and complexity of the total manufacturing
process, including an overall analysis of manufacturing
systems for the DOD efforts being considered, comprehensive
manufacturing, engineering, and plant modernization planning,
and a structure and set of priorities for these efforts.
IMIP initiatives in the contracting area may be originat-
ed through requirements set forth in solicitations or mutual
Government and contractor agreement before or during per-
formance of a Government contract or class of contracts,
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including flow-down of IMIP provisions to subcontractors,
whether or not they participate in other IMIP arrangements.
This may be accomplished by:
1. Contract provisions that affect only a single con-
tract, a group of contracts, all contracts of a
procuring activity, all contracts of a DOD Component
or all contracts of the entire Department of Defense,
2. A contract with a prime contractor with flow-down
to subcontractors or vendors. This shall not preclude
a subcontractor from participating in an IMIP with
multiple prime contractors or directly with the De-
partment of Defense, or
3. Other appropriate arrangements as may be determined
by the DOD Component involved. [Ref. 2: p. 5]
Validating savings and benefits is to be done utilizing
the system developed by the contractor and approved by the
DOD Component. The system must be well documented; inte-
grated in the overall IMIP implementation plan; consistent
with the manner in which the contractor collects and pro-
poses costs; and include a mechanism that permits reporting,
validating and auditing of realized cost savings and benefits
All funding for IMIP efforts will be provided ideally
by contractors; however, DOD funding may be provided when in
the best interest of the Government. DOD funding may be
from the individual program involved or from broader func-
tionally oriented funding. All funding is governed by DOD
Instruction 4 200.15, "Manufacturing Technology (MANTECH)
Program" and DOD Directive 4 2 75.5, "Acquisition and Manage-
ment of Industrial Resources."
Contractor investment protection should be provided by
the recovery of funds from contract termination. When
21

termination does not yield sufficient funds to finance out-
standing contingent liabilities which will become actual
obligations, it is the responsibility of the procuring
activity to ensure, before cancellation, that sufficient
funds to accommodate the obligation (s) will be available.
Many incentives are available under the IMIP. Some of
the primary ones are shared productivity rewards, contractor
investment protection, performance incentives fees, award
fees, multi-year contracts, and Government funding.
The contractor's cash flow is of importance when evaluat-
ing proposed IMIP efforts. Impediments to increased capital
investment resulting from the cash flow may be eased by
unusual progress payments or advance payments.
Technology transfer is the final procedure addressed by
the proposed instruction.
IMIP provisions must provide for the transfer of
•technology, early domestic dissemination of technical
data and the control of foreign dissemination of
technical data. [Ref. 2: p. 7]
E. PROPOSED DOD GUIDE TO IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY
The draft DOD Guide, "Improving Productivity In Defense
Contracting" was the second document authorized for uti-
lization and modification during the IMIP test period.
The objective of this Guide is to facilitate reaching
a sound business arrangement whereby both the DOD and
the DOD contractors can benefit through capital invest-
ments to improve productivity. [Ref. 3: ForewardJ
This is reflected in the six chapters of the Guide which
cover productivity-related assumptions, the concept of
22

Return on Investment (ROI) and methods of computing same,
contract incentives as a means of reducing the uncertainty
associated with defense contracts, general applications of
Government technology funding, the negotiation process as
a means to accomplish an objective, and the importance of
benefit tracking.
Productivity is often said to be primarily influenced
by technology and capital. That is, productivity
varies in almost direct proportion to the application of
technology and capital. Various national studies have
shown that capital and technology can account for
approximately seventy percent of the rate of produc-
tivity growth. [Ref . 3: p. 1]
However, the Guide does make the point that although the
productivity rate increase of the Defense Industrial Base
(DIB) is declining and the cost of new weapon systems has
been increasing at an exponential rate since the end of
World War II, productivity is not the only cause. It is a
vital element, though, and one which can be identified and
attacked.
Return on Investment (ROI) is a central concept in the
business community and, according to the Guide, one which
should be adopted by the DOD to enable it to invest in
modern cost reduction technology/equipment. As applied to
DOD investments, it would involve the analysis of the invest-
ment and the stream of cash flows that are projected to be
generated based on the discounted cash flow (DCF) method
using the internal rate of return (IRR) methodology. The
comparison of the ROI to a standard or opportunity cost
23

would determine whether it was in the best interest of the
Government to invest with the contractor.
Contract incentives are identified by the Guide as a
means of reducing the uncertainty of defense contracts,
thus removing a major impediment to making cost reduction
investments. Some of the uncertainties listed are the annual
buy syndrome, the need for a large up-front investment with
a long payback period and a slow recovery for ROI purposes.
The three primary incentives introduced by the Guide to
alleviate the above handicaps are the use of termination
protection provisions, award fee provisions, and shared
savings provisions
.
The Guide presents a new perspective on the general
application of Government technology funding. Government
technology funding to design state-of-the-art weapon systems
in the defense industry has existed for many years, but the
Guide proposes that the funding be expanded to the actual
methods of manufacturing the systems. This upgrade of the
DIB is to be accomplished by the use of the Manufacturing
Technology (MANTECH) Program, the Technology Modernization
(TECHMOD) Program (The MANTECH and TECHMOD Programs are
briefly introduced by the Guide. They are covered by the
Guide to the level described in the remainder of this para-
graph) , by integrating technology provisions, and by tech-
nology transfer. The MANTECH Program will contribute to
an improved DIB by initiatives which will:
24

1. Aid in the economical/timely production of quali-
tatively superior weapons systems/components in
both direct and indirect manufacturing cost center
areas;
2. Ensure that advanced manufacturing processes, tech-
niques and equipment are available and will be used
to reduce DOD material acquisition costs;
3. Continuously advance manufacturing technology to




Ensure that more effective industrial innovation
and capital investment in new plant and equipment
are stimulated by reducing the up-front cost and
risk of advancing and applying new and improved
manufacturing technology; and
5. Ensure that manufacturing technologies used to
produce DOD material are consistent with safety,
environmental, energy, product assurance, and foreign
critical strategic materials dependency objectives
of the DOD. [Ref. 3: p. 19]
The Technology Modernization Program is a partnership
between the Government and the contractor for the applica-
tion of capital and technology with the goal of increased
contractor productivity and responsiveness. It generally
entails a three phase effort:
1. Phase I is a top down factory analysis which both
evaluates the needs of the overall facility and
identifies candidate manufacturing technologies which
are applicable to the types of systems produced in
the factory. At the culmination of Phase I is a
negotiated "business deal" between the Government and
the contractor. The business deal establishes the
ground rules for Phases II and III,
2. Phase II is the development of the enabling technolo-
gies and design of the factory modernization enhance-
ments. Phase II also identifies implementation
plans, specifies hardware/software operational
requirements and validates specific applications
through method demonstrations, and
3. Phase III is the implementation of the Technology
Modernization Program, including purchases and
25

installation of capital equipment to implement
those Phase II candidates that demonstrate highest
potential payback. [Ref. 3, p. 20]
Technology transfer is a critical element. "Special
contracts provisions are required to ensure the technology
established is transferable to other industry contractors.
Provisions must also be included to ensure that foreign
dissemination is controlled" [Ref. 3: p. 22].
The negotiation process attempts to define a sound busi-
ness arrangement that includes significant benefits for the
Government and the contractor. It is, according to the
Guide, necessary for the eventual success of the Program
and should be approached objectively looking at the methods
of reaching the objective, the degree of competition, the
method of calculating the ROI, the application of the
weighted guidelines procedures (DAR 3-808) for profit
determination, and assessing the benefits to be accrued by
the Government.
Benefit tracking, or a system of validating savings,
is vital because the basic justification for any manufac-
turing cost reduction program is the forecasted cost savings
A sound system for computing cost savings must be
developed by the contractor and approved by the Govern-
ment. This system must be well documented and based
upon sound logic. More importantly, the system must
be integrated into the overall factory planning system.
It must be consistent with the manner in which the
company collects and proposes costs. [Ref. 3: p. 2 8]
However, the Guide stresses that the effectiveness of a
manufacturing cost reduction program cannot be judged by
26

validating projected cost savings, but must be measured by
the actual results of the program.
F. FORMAL DESCRIPTION SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a detailed review of the
measures taken by the DOD in authorizing the IMIP. The
purpose of this summary is to highlight some of the key
elements of the planned Program implementation.
The Industrial Modernization Incentives Program assumes
improved productivity may be obtained by the application of
capital and technology to the manufacturing process. The
Government has been involved in the application of tech-
nology to the design of state-of-the-art weapon systems for
many years, but the application of technology and capital
to the manufacturing process represents a new perspective.
It is not an entirely new program though, as it is based on
the existing military service programs of Technology Moderni-
zation and Industrial Productivity. It differs from the
existing programs because it is a formal, tri-service effort
managed by the OSD and it has clearly defined objectives,
policies
, written procedures (the DOD Instruction "Indus-
trial Modernization Incentives Program" and the DOD Guide
"Improving Productivity in Defense Contracting"), and task
assignments relating to enhanced productivity in the DIB.
In addition, its implementation emphasizes concurrent manage-





Specific program policies are addressed in the DOD In-
struction "Industrial Modernization Incentives Program-"
The primary policy, that of improved productivity in the
DIB, is viewed as the end result of the accomplishment of
several objectives. Some of the goals are to improve the
manufacturing process to provide for the economical produc-
tion of defense material, improved contractor responsiveness,
reduced life-cycle costs of defense systems, reduced lead
time, increased surge and mobilization capabilities, in-
creased utilization of advanced manufacturing technology,
improved product quality and reliability, and improvements
to the DIB based on a long term perspective. The presumption
of the IMIP is that the accomplishment of these goals will
result in improved productivity and related benefits to the
DOD and the. civilian sector.
The IMIP assumes that industry has not made technology-
enhancing investments due to certain disincentives asso-
ciated with dealing with the DOD. Two of the primary
disincentives identified are a reduction in negotiated pro-
fits based on a reduction in the costs of performance and
the risks, such as termination or reduction in scope,
inherent in contracting with the Government. The purpose
of the IMIP is to mitigate or eliminate disincentives and to
motivate contractors to invest capital in technological
manufacturing improvements. Some of the methods for doing
this are shared productivity rewards based on a ROI approach
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or on a percentage basis, contractor investment protection,
performance incentive fees, award fees, multiyear contracts,
and Government funding of plant upgrades.
Implementation of the IMIP is to be based on a three
phase effort. During Phase I, both a top down factory
analysis of the prospective contractor and an analysis of
the applicable manufacturing technologies are evaluated by
established criteria for selection to participate in the
Program. The criteria for selection are that the contractor
would not, under normal conditions (not participating in the
program) make the investment, there is a reasonable expec-
tation that the Government will benefit from the arrangement,
full funding for the projected quantities is expected, the
investment will improve the productivity of the base and
not support new production capacity, and other benefits to
the Government will accrue. For contractors selected to
participate, the conclusion of Phase I is a "business deal"
with the Government that outlines the basis of Phases II
and III and describes funding responsibilities. Funding
will normally be provided by contractors, but, if it is in
the best interest of the Government, DOD may provide funding.
During Phase II, method demonstrations are to be used to
validate specific applications, operational requirements
are to be identified and enabling technologies and factory/
equipment designs are to be developed. In addition, pro-
jected cost reductions are to be determined at this time.
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In Phase III, the final step, the physical actions necessary
to implement the program in the plant are to be accomplished
The task of evaluating implementation in the area of effec-
tiveness is assigned to the Heads of DOD Components and is
to be done utilizing the contractor designed system approved
by the DOD Component in Phase I. This validation and audit
of realized cost savings and benefits is one of two factors
to be used to measure effectiveness. The other factor is a
subjective analysis of the actual success of the program.
Key players are identified and tasked with both general
and specific responsibilities by the IMIP. The USDR&E is
tasked with managing the program and coordinating it within
the various branches of the Government. Heads of DOD
Components have the more specific tasks of assessing the
IMIP, coordinating it within the DOD, evaluating its imple-
mentation, planning for financing contingent liabilities,
and ensuring that the program is implemented and understood
at the working level. DOD Component acquisition and program
managers are assigned detailed, technical responsibilities
within their respective areas. Tasks regarding the initial
design, implementation, and development of the IMIP are
assigned to the two groups formed by the Charter, the Steer-
ing Group and the Support Team. Some of the primary respon-
sibilities assigned to the Steering Group are monitoring the
conduct and results of the test program, defining the time
and scope of the test, addressing the issue of funding and
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monitoring contingent liabilities. The Support Team is
tasked with assisting DOD managers and industry, the prepara-
tion and implementation of instructions, coordinating joint




III. STATUS OF THE IMIP IMPLEMENTATION
A. THE CONCEPT ACQUIRES SUBSTANCE
The primary objective of the IMIP is to:
Develop and refine contract incentives which encourage
defense industries to use their own funds for produc-
tivity-enhancing capital investments. [Ref. 4: p. 42]
While this objective is conceptually simple, it is extremely
complex in application. To provide an understanding of the
implementation status of the IMIP, this chapter addresses
the current status of several developments upon which the
success of the Program depends. To accomplish this, the
activities of the individuals providing guidance to the
Program are explained, the types of contracts to which the
IMIP is considered applicable are outlined, the Program's
perceived relationship to the AIP is explained, the time
period of the test is explored, sources of funding are dis-
cussed, dissemination of Program information at the working
level is addressed, the discounted cash flow model as it
applies to the IMIP is reviewed, and old and new IMIP
partnerships are defined. The conclusion of the chapter
is a brief summary of the above listed topics and other
relevant, but minor points of interest regarding the imple-
mentation of the Program.
B. IMIP GUIDANCE
The Industrial Modernization Incentives Program is being
implemented under the guidance of a Steering and a Working
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Group. As requested in the IMIP Authorization Letter, the
Navy selected Rear Admiral J.S. Sansone, SC, USN, to serve
as the initial chairperson of the IMIP Steering Group. Dr.
R.A. Stimson, Director of the Office of Industrial Produc-
tivity, represents the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) on the Steering Group; the Army is represented by
Major General R.L. Herriford, Sr. , USA, Director of Army
Procurement and Production; the Air Force is represented
by Brigadier General B.L. Weiss, USAF, Director of Air Force
Contracting and Manufacturing Policy; and the Defense Logis-
tics Agency (DLA) is represented by Major General J.H.
Connolly, USAF, Deputy Director, DLA Acquisition Management.
The IMIP Steering Group convenes quarterly or on an
as-required basis to address IMIP issues.
The focus of the meetings to date has centered 'on
DOD Component organization of the .IMIP test, development
of implementation plans, and maintaining overall visi-
bility over the test. [Ref. 5: p. 2]
The Support Team, now referred to as the Working Group,
is chaired by Commander J.F. Hering, SC, USN, Special
Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Naval Material for Con-
tracts, and staffed by personnel from the Navy, Air Force,
Army, DLA, Defense Contracts Administration Agency (DCAA)
and OSD. The Working Group meets monthly or on an as-
required basis, at which time it approaches IMIP related
issues by the use of a formal agenda that is promulgated to
the members prior to the meeting by the Chairperson of the
Working Group. During the meetings, issue papers on IMIP
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topics prepared by the Group members are discussed; committees
comprised of Group members present findings and make recom-
mendations on subjects that are considered too complex or
involved for initial consideration by the entire Group;
external, independent experts speak on IMIP related sub-
jects; decisions are made by group consensus; and new IMIP
areas are introduced.
Enthusiastic support of the IMIP and an in-depth com-
prehension of the Program by the Support Team is essential
if the concept is to succeed. Based on first hand observa-
tion of the Support Team, most notably attending a meeting
of the Team on 27 August 19 83, it appears that these quali-
ties are present in those involved with the IMIP guidance.
C." IMIP APPLICABLE CONTRACTS
It is recognized by those providing the IMIP guidance
that the Program is not applicable to all DOD contracts.
In addition to the criteria for selection of contracts
described in Chapter II, there are other factors that might
preclude inclusion in the IMIP. Some of these factors are
the wrong type of manufacturing process, a small projected
dollar value of the program, an unstable program, or conse-
quent adverse effects to competition.
The primary application of the IMIP is to assembly line
type operations where improvements in output or reductions
in input can be measured. It would be difficult, if not
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impossible, to apply the Program to shipbuilding or other
industries where each end item is different.
The IMIP is not economically feasible for low dollar
value contracts. The Government would not profit because
the IMIP savings would be offset by increased contract
administration costs. The contractor would likewise have
increased costs, difficulty in obtaining an adequate ROI,
and would face an impossible task in tracing and verifying
costs if they represent a small portion of his business.
A stable program is required for the IMIP. Projected
savings cannot be determined unless there is a solid pro-
jection of the size and scope of the program. This is
especially important to the Government because, under an
IMIP arrangement, the Government assumes most of the risk
associated with reduction in the total amount of the
contract.
It is not the intent of the Program to stifle competi-
tion within the DIB. In that regard, an effort will be
made to give all contractors in a competitive environment
equal access to the benefits associated with the IMIP.
D. RELATIONSHIP TO THE ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
The stated goal for which the IMIP was initiated is to
support the DOD Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) Initia-
tive Number Five, "Encourage Capital Investment To Enhance
Productivity." It continues to be officially backed for
this purpose. This is demonstrated in the "AIP Second Year
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Report" of 18 May 1983 included in the Deputy Secretary of
Defense Memorandum of 8 June 1983, "Guidance on the AIP."
In the Report, the IMIP is listed as one of the mechanisms
to encourage capital investment by DOD contractors to in-
crease their productivity with the recommendation that:
OSD and the Services should continue to actively
encourage and support the test of the IMIP which
is underway. USDRE should report progress on the Pro-
gram to the DEPSECDEF quarterly. [Ref. 6: p. 7]
E. TEST PERIOD EXTENSION
The initial IMIP test period did not have a scheduled
completion date (the specific job of defining the time of
the test program was assigned to the Steering Group by the
IMIP Test Charter) , but a period of one year was generally
understood to be implied by the IMIP implementing documents
The time frame of the test period has since been addressed
by the Steering and Working Groups and extended beyond one
year. As the result of a 21 June 1983 request from the
Joint Logistics Commanders to complete the test within nine
months, an extension of the test period was considered.
This extension (from December 1983 to March 1984) of
the original .. .test schedule will allow more in-depth
analysis of the complex issues surrounding IMIP.
[Ref. 3: p. 1]
Subsequent to the move to extend the test to March 1984,
the Working Group decided that more time would be required
for the test. As of this writing, a firm completion date
for the test has not been determined, but late 19 8 5 is
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considered by the Support Team to be a likely time for the
conclusion of the test.
F. IMIP FUNDING
As discussed in the previous chapter, IMIP funding will
normally be provided by contractors, but, if it is in the
best interest of the Government, DOD may provide funding.
The sources of DOD funding and interim policy guidance
regarding the use of financial resources for implementing
the IMIP were specified by a USDR&E memorandum on the sub-
ject dated 17 June 1983. According to the USDR&E and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
,
Direct Government funding may be provided from the
individual acquisition programs involved, or from
the appropriate categories of Program Element (PE)
78011, "Industrial Preparedness." Attached is a re-
vised PE description for PE 78011, which adds a new
sub-element for IMIP activities not currently pro-
vided for. The categories and preferred sources of
IMIP funding are shown in the attached table. Proce-
dures outlined in DUSD letter dated 2 November 1982
(discussed in Chapter II, Section B) , and/or the re-






SOURCE OF FUNDS IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE
STRUCTURED
WEAPONS ANALYSIS/
CONTRAC- SYSTEM/ APPLICATIONS MFG*
DELIVERABLE TOR SYSTEM ENGINEERING* TECH
Technology—Application
Engineering
Single weapon system 1st 2nd No No










application 1st 3rd No 2nd
IMIP Structured Analysis 1st 2nd 3rd No
Incentive Awards
Single or multi




weapon system 1st No No No
*
Sub-element of PE 78011, "Industrial Preparedness"
[Ref. 8: Attachment]
The USDR&E quote and table indicate that in all cases,
except Incentive Award contracts for single or multi-weapon
systems, the primary source of funds should be the contrac-
tor. Secondary sources are determined by the type of
deliverable and vary between the individual acquisition
programs and PE 78011.
The USDR&E IMIP Funding memorandum not only represents
an expansion of PE 78011 to include a sub-element for IMIP
related activities, but also provides policy on funding
applications. By so doing, a flexible IMIP funding policy
is established.
G. DISSEMINATION OF IMIP INFORMATION AT THE WORKING LEVEL
One of the tasks charged to the Support Team by the
IMIP Test Charter is to provide training and assistance
to program and acquisition managers and to industry. Indus-
try has been appraised of the concept and status of the
IMIP by industry conferences sponsored by the National
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Security Industrial Association and by the distribution of
IMIP information packages to industry associations. Acqui-
sition and program managers have been kept informed on the
IMIP by DOD Components.
DOD Component information packages and implementation
plans have been developed and distributed to field
activities. Initial DOD Component training sessions
have been held to introduce the concepts and procedures
to the wide variety of personnel at various levels
within the organizations necessary to support develop-
ment of IMIP agreements. The Navy is taking a somewhat
unique approach by establishing formally designated
multi-disciplined IMIP teams in its field commands.
[Ref. 9: p. 2]
H. CASE-STUDY APPROACH TO IMIP DEVELOPMENT
Future policy development is intended to be based on
the effects of various incentives and their motivational
aspects as observed during the IMIP test and documented
by the case-study approach. The task of developing appro-
priate case studies is assigned to the Logistics Management
Institute (LMI) . The General Dynamics (F-16) and Westing-
house (multi-program) agreements developed under the Air
Force Technology Modernization Program (the precursor to
the IMIP) , and included in the Air Force segment of the IMIP
test, are targeted for the initial analysis of the IMIP
issues. Draft analyses on the aforesaid agreements were
submitted by LMI in July 19 83 and are presently being
reviewed by the Air Force. The case study approach for
documenting on-going efforts and analyzing the complex
issues involved is perceived as the single most important
aspect of the IMIP test. Key issues being analyzed are:
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Compilation of detailed contract status sheets;
development of an initial series of issue papers
to crystallize ideas, foxus attention, and ensure
a common understanding of issues; and refinement of
a ROI model. [Ref . 5: p. 4]
With the exception of the refinement of a ROI model, the
key issues have yet to be firmly defined.
I. THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL
As discussed in the Guide, the generally accepted method
of computing the ROI resulting from an individual capital
investment is by the discounted cash flow (DCF) method.
This method, based on the internal rate of return (IRR)
methodology (the IRR is the after-tax earning power of an
investment and is the discount rate that makes the present
value of all cash inflows equal to the present value of all
cash outflows) , has been developed into a "spread sheet"
program by LMI . This program differs from the standard
DCF models used in the civilian sector in that it takes into
account the effect of Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) 409
and 414.
CAS 409, "Depreciation of Tangible Capital Assets,"
has as its stated purpose:
To provide criteria and guidance for assigning cost of
tangible capital assets to cost accounting periods
and for allocating such costs to cost objectives within
such periods in an objective and consistent manner...
[Ref. 10: p. 189]
The result of CAS 409 on the LMI model is that a contractor,
based on the original acquisition cost of an asset and its
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service life, is directly reimbursed for depreciation under
a government contract.
CAS 414, "Cost Of Money As An Element Of The Cost Of
Facilities Capital," has as its stated purpose,
To establish criteria for the measurement and alloca-
tion of the cost of capital committed to facilities as
an element of contract cost... [Ref. 10: p. 250]
Thus, the effect of CAS 414 on the LMI model is a cash
in-flow resulting from the reimbursable cost of money
imputed in accordance with DAR 15-205.50 (a), "Facilities
Capital Cost of Money."
A sample output of the LMI model is included as Appendix
A. It uses numerical values similar to the IMIP Guide demon-
stration model, a contractor ROI target of 20 percent, and
assumes a productivity savings at 30 percent with a contract
duration and life of equipment of 9 years. Initial invest-
ments are $100M from the contractor and $10M of direct
Government funding. Positive cash flows are shown for the
items of Imputed CAS 414 Interest (the interest rate is
variable, but the net book value under CAS 409 is the basis
for the computation) , Profit of Facilities (the net book
value is derived under CAS 4 09 and the rate is obtained
from the Weighted Guidelines (DAR 3-808.7)), CAS 409 Depre-
ciation (based on the Sum-of-Years/Kalf Year Convention)
,
and Profit on Depreciation (depreciation expense, as an
allowable contract cost, bears a profit that is adjusted to
70 percent of the gross amount) . Negative cash flows are
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evidenced by Profit on Savings (this represents profits
lost due to reduced costs of production) , Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (ACRS) Depreciation (the method used by the
contractor for income tax purposes) , and Income Tax. Under
the parameters presented, assuming shared savings, and
taking advantage of an investment tax credit the first
year, the contractor would experience an ROI of 20 percent
with a 2.7 year payback period; the DOD would experience a
15.2 percent ROI with a 6.9 year payback period; and the
Government would experience a 27.7 percent ROI with a 5.3
year payback period. Rates vary between the DOD and the
Government because tax effects applicable to the Government
do not pertain to the DOD.
J. EXISTING IMIP PARTNERSHIPS
Prior to the implementation of the IMIP, the Air Force
and Army had on-going productivity programs under the Air
Force Technology Modernization (TECHMOD) Program and the
Army Industrial Productivity Incentive (IPI) Program. These
programs have been continued as part of the IMIP test, but
have not been renamed due to various factors, such as the
concern voiced by the services that renaming ongoing pro-
grams might confuse contractors, the desire to retain more
control over service programs than would be possible under
a DOD program, and variations in the approach to funding
between the services and the DOD. Although the Air Force
and Army arrangements predate the IMIP, it may be stated
42

that the Air Force has IMIP type partnerships with General
Dynamics, Westinghouse, Rockwell International, Boeing
Military Aircraft, Pratt and Whitney, General Electric,
Hazletine, Sonicraft, Hughes Tucson, and GELAC/AVCO; and
the Army has a similar partnership with AVCO-Lycoming and
Harris Corporation.
K. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF NEW IMIP PARTNERSHIPS
The Navy, which had no IMIP-type arrangements prior to
the implementation of the Program is progressing with
several efforts. The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).
is currently in Phase I with Northrup and Hughes Aircraft
and will soon enter Phase II with Grumman by signing a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the company. The Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has been in Phase II since the
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with General
Dynamics, Pomona Division, and its subcontractor, Thiokol
Corporation, on 8 September 19 83. This initial Navy MOU
between NAVSEA, General Dynamics, and Thiokol is the first
DOD ground-up application of the IMIP, and as such, is a
significant step in the application of the Program by the
tri-service team.
The basis of the NAVSEA MOU (included as Appendix B)
is that Thiokol, as the subcontractor to General Dynamics,
will invest its funds in productivity enhancing facility
improvements, and that NAVSEA will share the savings with
Thiokol. According to the MOU,
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General Dynamics, as long as it is the prime contrac-
tor for the MK 104 Dual Thrust Rocket Motorr, will
manage, monitor, audit, and maintain overall cognizance
over the incorporation of up to approximately seven
million dollars of improvements to facilities by Thiokol,
including new equipment and engineering management
applications, to improve overall productivity through
advanced technologies which will reduce the production
costs of the MK-104 Dual Thrust Rocket Motor...
NAVSEA will provide the opportunity for Thiokol Corpo-
ration to recoup its investment and a reasonable return
thereon, through shared savings based upon baseline
prices to be negotiated. [Ref. 11: p. 1]
The Government reserves the right to terminate the IMIP MOU
in the event that the production of MK-10 4 motors is com-
pleted or Thiokol loses the competition prior to the recov-
ery of depreciation for the IMIP related facility improvements
In that event, termination protection is provided to Thiokol
in the not-to-exceed amount of Government liability of the





GFY 8 7 -0-
It appears that this abbreviated (three page) MOU contains
the basic elements required under the IMIP, such as an
incentive for the contractor to upgrade his plant, a means
whereby the Government can release itself from the arrange-
ment, and termination protection for the contractor.
The potential IMIP MOA between NAVAIR and the Grumman
Aerospace Corporation is much more detailed than the NAVSEA
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MOU. This MOA, which is anticipated to be signed soon, is
comprised of the following eight sections:








6. Terms and Conditions,
7. Administration, and
8. Technology Transfer and Subcontractor IMIP Flow- Down.
In the first section, the "Introduction and Background,
"
the MOA provides the information that:
As a deliverable end-item of Phase I, Grumman submitted
a proposal in March 19 83, which presented Phase I re-
sults and the rationale for NAVAIR authorization to
proceed to Phase II and Phase III. [Ref. 12: P. 1J
The "Purpose" section discusses the IMIP Business Ar-
rangement between Grumman and NAVAIR for Phases II and III
as well as establishing the MOA as the basis for any future
arrangements. It also identifies the applicable contracts
and states that the framework for sharing risks, costs, and
savings will be described later in the Agreement.
The section on "Definitions" is next. Most of the twenty
terms defined are routine and are listed only as points of
clarification. Others though, such as Contractor Invest-
ment, Validation, Implementation Phase, Implementation Costs,
and Government Business Base are noteworthy as they are
unique to the IMIP. Contractor Investment is defined as:
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Expenditures by the contractor of dollars, materials,
services, or labor for IMIP identified projects. Such
contractor expenditures may be considered investment
only if they would be capitalized according to the
contractor's standard accounting procedures or expensed
against retained earnings. [Ref. 12: p. 2]
Validation is defined as:
The procedure to establish the readiness to implement
a particular IMIP project and the magnitude of cost
savings which will be realized on that project. Valida-
tion is considered part of the development phase of the
program and will be in accordance with a Government
approved plan. [Ref. 12: p. 3]
Implementation Phase is defined as:
The phase of IMIP in which a developed and validated
IMIP project is incorporated into the production facility
and includes the period of transition from the old or
"As Is" production method to the new or "To Be" produc-
tion method. The implementation phase for a particular
IMIP project is completed when that IMIP project is
completed when that IMIP project is on-line. [Ref. 12: p. 4
J
Implementation Costs are defined as:
Those Government and contractor costs exclusive of con-
tractor capital equipment costs that are required to
implement an IMIP project into the production facility
(contractor cost) and onto a particular hardware con-
tract; e.g., special tooling and test equipment, etc.
(Government costs) . [Ref. 12: p. 4], and
Government Business Base is defined as:
That portion of the Contractor's firm and projected
business which will be considered for determining the
Government's benefits from IMIP improvements. Foreign
military sales related to IMIP improvements are also
included. [Ref. 12: p. 4]
"NAVAIR Commitments" are limited to two statements of
intent. The first is that NAVAIR intends to order under
the applicable contract in accordance with projected Govern-
ment funding. The second is that, if NAVAIR' s budget is
reduced below the projected funding level in one (or more)
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year(s) , the IMIP funding will be reduced by no greater a
percentage than the percentage reduction of the overall
NAVAIR budget for the year(s) . The point is also made that
if funding is reduced, the IMIP target ROI of each affected
IMIP project will be increased by an amount to be determined.
In the section titled "Grumman Commitments," the company
addresses four issues. The first is a statement of Grumman *
s
intention to complete a "Production Modernization Program"
and to tailor certain funding of that program to implement
improvements developed and/or validated under the IMIP. The
second is the agreement to fund approximately 50 percent of
the Phase II costs and the identification of the potential
sources of those funds. The third issue is a statement that
project development funding will be identifiable through
the company's cost accounting procedures and verifiable by
the Navy's in-plant representative, and an agreement to
collect and segregate costs on IMIP projects when practical.
The final issue is an agreement that, in the event of a
curtailment of NAVAIR funding resulting in an increase in
the ROI, Grumman will provide additional funding to complete
in-process task orders at the price previously negotiated.
The "Terms and Conditions" section is divided into sub-
sections on Direct Labor Hour Savings Determination, Other
Cost Saving Determination, Savings Validation, and Savings
Sharing.
The "Direct Labor Hour Savings Determination" subsection
describes how the direct labor baseline will be established
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from projected system cost data based on the learning curve
slope derived from actual cost data and cost element analy-
sis. This baseline will then be proposed to each Primary
Contracting Officer (PCO) involved for negotiation.
The negotiated system direct labor baselines will be
incorporated into this MOA and will form the reference
from which all savings under the IMIP generated by
direct labor hour reductions will be measured.
[Ref. 12: p. 9]
Baseline adjustments will be proposed annually by Grumman,
then negotiated, and agreed to by both parties. These
adjustments are considered to be necessary to reflect the
changes in design, specifications, make-or-buy, or produc-
tion rate.
The "Other Cost Savings Determination" subsection deals
with the determination by Grumman of other cost savings re-
sulting from IMIP projects.
The savings determination will be made by comparing
the "As Is" method of application with the "To Be" method
during each IMIP project validation. The savings value
established for each system will be added to the direct
labor hour savings... [Ref. 12: p. 10]
The subsection on "Savings Validation" outlines the
specific validation procedure which is that, no later than
six months before the end of the development phase of each
IMIP project, Grumman will propose a procedure, and NAVAIR
and Grumman will mutually agree on it. The guidelines of
the validation procedure are that it must identify and project
both direct labor costs and savings of other costs.
The "Savings Sharing" subsection explains that:
The cost savings share to be received by Grumman repre-
sents the incentive for Grumman to expend capital funds
48

for cost reductions and industrial modernization through
IMIP projects instead of for other purposes. Accordingly,
a performance incentive will be structured so that
Grumman and NAVAIR both benefit from IMIP cost reduction.
Only savings generated by IMIP efforts covered by the MOA
are to be used for recovery of investment and ROI
realization. [Ref. 12: p. 12]
In addition, this subsection specifies that to qualify for
full savings sharing, Grumman must complete the facility
and technology implementation on schedule and achieve the
projected savings. A 50/50 basis will be utilized for savings
sharing for the time (not to exceed five years) required to
provide Grumman with the target ROI for each IMIP project.
The target ROI will be computed using the DCF model. The
sharing ratio may be adjusted as necessary in the event the
target ROI cannot be achieved within five years on an IMIP
project. Data for computation of the ROI on the DCF model
will be supplied to NAVAIR for negotiation at the time of
project savings validation.
The "Administration" section is divided into subsections
on the Relationship of the Parties, Cost Savings, and
Contract Adjustments.
In the "Relationship of the Parties" subsection, the
period of the direct contractual relationship is delineated
as at least five years, the method of maintaining the rela-
tionship is specified as a Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA),,
and the Navy is designated as the lead DOD service in the
event other Government agencies become involved. As the
lead service, the Navy, represented by NAVAIR, is tasked with
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establishing appropriate agreements between all participating
Government agencies and the negotiation and administration
with Grumman of individual IMIP project proposals.
Cost Savings, as they apply to NAVAIR, are to be calcu-
lated by converting validated direct labor savings and other
cost savings into then year dollars on a yearly basis. This
amount should then be credited to NAVAIR by reductions in
current contracts and the pricing of future contracts.
Contract adjustments, the means whereby cost savings will
be passed to NAVAIR, may be applied to current contracts
(Firm Fixed Price (FFP) or Fixed Price Incentive (FPI)
)
and future contracts. The price of FFP contracts is to be
reduced by 100 percent of the validated cost savings while
the target price, target cost, and ceiling price of FPI
contracts are to reflect a reduction of 100 percent of the
validated cost savings projected. The share of the savings
projected allocated to Grumman will be set aside as a per-
formance incentive payment. Future contract proposals should
be based on, and show, cost benefits anticipated to accrue
due to IMIP improvements. Implementing language for future
contracts is also included as Special Provisions under the
Contract Adjustment subsection. Termination of Project is
the final subject covered by this subsection. According to
the MOA:
During the course of performance of this Phase II ef-
fort under any given IMIP project either party may ter-
minate the project if a written technical determination
can be made that the project is not successful. Such
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determination will be made at no fault to either party
and that order may be terminated at no cost to either
party. Such determination may not be made solely be-
cause of lack of Government funding or inability on
the part of Grumman to implement the project within the
fixed dollar amount of the task order. [Ref. 12: p. 19]
"Technology Transfer and Subcontractor IMIP Flow-Down"
is the concluding section of the MOA. In this section,
Grumman agrees to the transfer of IMIP related technology
developments throughout the aerospace industry, to maintain
comprehensive documentation on each technology related
advancement project, and, by the means of conferences,
meetings, and solicitations, to encourage subcontractors,
suppliers, and vendors to participate in the IMIP.
L. IMIP STATUS SUMMARY
Significant progress has been made in implementing the
IMIP since it was authorized on 2 November 19 82. Steering
and Support Teams have been organized and are operating on
a routine basis to organize the IMIP test, address related
topics, resolve current issues, and plan future actions.
The tri-service teams have successfully solved most of the
initial implementation problems and are moving on to the
more complex areas of changes to the DAR and adapting the
IMIP to a competitive environment.
The method by which the Program will be evaluated has
been established as the case-study. The first case-studies
of the pre-IMIP TECHMOD arrangements between the Air Force
and General Dynamics and the Air Force and Westinghouse have
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been submitted by LMI and are currently under DOD review.
LMI has also developed a DCF model. This model, which dif-
fers from standard DCF models used in the private sector
by taking into account the effect of CAS 409 and 414, will
be used to evaluate contractor proposals and projected ROIs
prior to entering into IMIP arrangements.
IMIP-type arrangements that preceded the IMIP, such as
the Air Force TECHMOD and the Army IPI, have been continued
and are now included under the IMIP umbrella. New business
arrangements have been instituted by the Navy as evidenced
by the NAVSEA MOU with General Dynamics and Thiokol and the
pending NAVAIR MOA with Grumman.
The IMIP test is progressing in a consistent, step-by-
step manner. Numerous preliminary problems of the Program
have been overcome by the teams, but it is recognized that
many major issues, such as developing an objective method




IV. HISTORICAL ELEMENTS OF THE IMIP
A. OVERVIEW
The driving force behind the rapid government and indus-
try acceptance of the IMIP was its conceptual simplicity
and its almost universal appeal as a solution for major
governmental problems. Some of these problems have been
in the forefront of public interest and have plagued govern-
ment for decades.
Problem elements which the IMIP addresses directly or
indirectly include:
1. Productivity,
2. Rising Weapon Systems Costs,
3. Declining Industrial Base and DOD Profit Policy.
In each problem element, the IMIP provides apparent
solutions which cater to the political, social, and material
needs of government, the populace, and industry. The fol-
lowing sections develop these elements and show significant
historical events to explain how each element is associated
with the IMIP.
In presenting the elements above, there is considerable
overlap in the conceptual format. For example, productivity
and DOD profit policy directly affect weapon systems costs,
and the declining industrial base is affected by productivity
and DOD profit policy. Therefore, identical historical
events can, and will, be presented in each applicable
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Every society is faced with the problem of resource
scarcity, due to an infinite desire for goods. It is
productivity as applied to the scarce resources that deter-
mines the amount of goods produced. Productivity is gener-
ally measured as output per unit of resource input [Ref. 44:
p. 193]. As greater output is achieved per unit of resource
input, societal wealth is created. This produces increases
in the standard of living. For example, assume society A
has 100 lbs. of resources which it is capable of manufac-
turing into 15 units of marketable finished goods, and
society B has an identical 100 lbs. of resources which it
is capable of manufacturing into 20 units of marketable
finished goods due to some form of manufacturing or manage-
ment advantage. (This advantage could be attributed to more
efficient capital, labor, technology, various allocations
thereof, or relative size advantage.) Given that the market
price of a unit of finished good is $20, it is obvious that
society B has $400 of collective welath compared to society
A*s $300 of collective wealth. Better productivity has
created an additional $100 of wealth for society B which it
may use to directly improve its standard of living or to
re-invest to further increase productivity. This increased
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wealth also increases government tax revenues in most tax
systems.
This basic example illustrates why the government
constantly attempts to improve productivity or to provide
an environment which is conducive to productivity improve-
ments. If the government succeeds, it is a political victory
since it simultaneously raises the overall standard of
living and broadens the tax base. An annual 2 percent in-
crease in output per manhour of labor, as a measure of pro-
ductivity improvement, doubles the output per manhour every
35 years. Since World War II, the United States has experi-
enced productivity growth of approximately 3 percent per
year. This rate doubles output every 23 years [Ref. 44:
p. 193] .
Productivity is a complicated subject despite the
simplistic modeling indicated above. Understanding produc-
tivity can be difficult at best. Mr. Edward F. Denison,
Senior Fellow- The Brookings Institution, was probably as
successful as most in his attempt to define the scope of
productivity "...to inquire into productivity is to investi-
gate almost every aspect of economic life" [Ref. 13: p. 114]
.
Productivity is influenced by a number of deter-
minants. In attempting to present the major determinants of
productivity, it is necessary to sift through a variety of
theories and select the most comprehensive list which is
considered to be acceptable by current economists. The





3. Advances in Knowledge,
4. Allocation of Resources, and
5. Economies of Scale. [Ref. 14: p. 22]
The substitution of capital for labor will increase
productivity, given that the substituted capital is more
efficient. With a rapid rate of technological advance, it
is generally assumed substituted capital will be more
efficient. Efficiency of capital can be characterized by
an output per time period increase, an associated labor
decrease, a better product, reduced maintenance and energy
costs, or any combination of these.
Productivity of labor is generally related to train-
ing, education and motivation. Labor productivity deals
specifically with output per unit of labor time. The greater
output per unit time, the greater productivity is achieved.
Professional training and general education level of labor
are recognized factors of labor productivity which can be
manipulated to improve productivity. However, it is possi-
ble to have the optimum in training and education but experi-
ence low productivity, related to low motivation. Labor
motivation is a sensitive problem which requires skillful
handling by management, labor leaders, and any intermediaries
Problems with labor motivation do not lend themselves to
universal solutions. Even apparently identical labor
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motivation problems will not require the same corrective
actions.
Technological advances provide a pool of knowledge
from which to apply ideas which have the potential to improve
production efficiency. Advances in knowledge are dependent
upon two basic factors: monetary capital channeled to
research and development, and information dissemination.
Greater spending on research and development creates a
greater pool of technology to draw upon for productivity
improvement. Dissemination of technology via information
systems is of primary importance to get technological ad-
vances out of the laboratory and into an environment where
they can be applied and adapted. Greater dissemination
realizes greater applications and increased productivity
gains
.
Resources include raw materials, capital, and labor.
If misallocation is present, the production is not efficient.
Given that the state of technology is constant, better
quality raw materials alone could increase productivity.
Fluctuations in the levels of capital and labor employed
will affect productive efficiency. Even the reorganization
of production (existing capital and labor) may yield produc-
tivity gains.
The economy of scale determinant technically implies
that there is a cost advantage of a seller or group of
sellers in some production area. This cost advantage could
be the result of patents or wholly-owned resources, knowledge
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obtained by doing (e.g., experience or learning curve effect),
or even well-established reputations, credit ratings, etc.
These cost advantages represent barriers to potential
entrants since they give the seller an average cost curve
in production which is the lowest in the marketplace [Ref
.
14: p. 24].
2 . Recent Decline in Productivity Growth
To view the decline in productivity growth, it is
necessary to go beyond broad input/output indicator figures
of Gross National Product (GNP) published by the Depart-
ment of Commerce. The decline in productivity growth must
be defined in terms of the average result of individual
productivity advances and declines across the entire indus-
trial spectrum. Productivity declines have not been experi-
enced in all industries
.
In addition, productivity decline is a misnomer in
that industry, as a whole, is continuing to experience
annual productivity growth. The point is that the percen-
tage of annual growth has declined in the period since the
mid-60' s. This is in contrast to the annual growth experi-
enced from 194 8, when the Department of Commerce first began
publishing the statistics, to 1966. It is well established
that a decline in the rate of productivity growth has
occurred, not a decline in productivity. Edgar R. Fiedler,
Vice-President for Economic Research, The Conference Board,
states that "the most important and most contentious
(national) issue is the retardation in the trend of productivity
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that has taken place since the mid-60's" [Ref. 14: p. 1].
The concern is not only that the retardation is slowing
growth in our standard of living, but also that this period
of retardation may lead to actual productivity declines in
the future.
Kendrick and Grossman in their work, "Productivity
In The United States," analyze Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) as a conceptual measure of productivity and trace
causal factors for the recent decline in productivity growth.
They use TFP to supplement their analysis of the Bureau Of
Labor Statistics estimates of output per labor hour. TFP
is a more informative measure in that it provides information
regarding intermediate input savings and efficiencies
achieved. Appendix C illustrates their breakdown of causal
factors contributing to the decline in productivity growth.
Kendrick and Grossman conclude that volume related
factors accounted for about 50 percent of the slowdown (due
to the aborted recovery from the 1974-75 recession) , slower
advances in applied knowledge accounted for about 20 percent
of the decline and the other 30 percent is accounted for by
changes in the quality of labor and land, resource realloca-
tions, net government impact, and residual factors.
The components of advances in applied knowledge in
the Kendrick and Grossman study are cost reducing innova-
tions, learning curve effects through new products streams,
and the rate of diffusion of new technology through changes
in the average age of business fixed capital. Kendrick and
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Grossman note that research and development outlays showed
a decline over the period 1966-76 and that research and
development was the only regression variable which had a
significant and stable relationship with productivity over
the two subperiods analyzed, 1948-66 and 1966-76. Addi-
tionally, the estimates of the average age of real business
stocks of structures and equipment declined an average of
3 years during the period 194 8-66, but an average of only
1 year during the period 1966-76. This would seem to indi-
cate, for various reasons, a reluctance to invest in equip-
ment resulting in aging capital equipment and slower produc-
tivity growth. Reluctance to invest in research and develop-
ment decreases the pool of technological advances available
for application.
3 . Chronology of the Productivity Issue
Productivity has been placed in a position of impor-
tance in government for many years. However, due to the
complexity of examining productivity, targeting improve-
ments, and adhering to a cost-based profit policy, attempts
to increase productivity growth have floundered. Indeed,
on the national level, the complexity of productivity and
the economic consequences of corrective actions is the primary
reason for lack of a consistent, coordinated policy state-
ment on the subject.
In 1968, at the peak of the Vietnam conflict and
large DOD budgets, the Rand Corporation published a compara-
tive study of negotiated contracting in the United States
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and the United Kingdom and concluded that "The U.S. dis-
criminates against capital intensive firms" [Ref. 15: p. 45].
This discrimination was manifesting itself in lower produc-
tivity throughout the Defense industrial base. Incentives
for capital investments were dealt a heavy blow with the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 19 69 which lowered middle
and low income households taxes and transferred the burden
to business corporations and individuals in high-income tax
brackets. Additionally, this legislation terminated the
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) introduced during the Kennedy
administration.
The opening of the decade of the 1970's did not bode
well for future productivity increases. The budget deficits,
tax increases, Vietnam conflict slowdown, and national public
mood combined to set the stage for an unprecedented event
in the United States. Indications of productivity declines
began surfacing; in 19 69-70, productivity growth fell to
its lowest levels in the postwar era. The Wall Street
Journal reported that "...businessmen have pared their 1971
capital spending plans and are scheduling the smallest rise
in outlays in a decade ... significant scaledowns in spending
plans were registered for aircraft. .. industries ... " [Ref. 16:
p. 3 J . In response to these alarming concerns, President
Nixon established the National Commission on Productivity
in 19 70 stating "No other single national goal is more
important to the American at present and future than new
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standards for revitalizing American productivity" [Ref. 13:
p. 6]. The Commission's second annual report recognized the
importance of capital investment and research and develop-
ment and noted that during 19 70-71 Japan annually plowed
back into investment 3 8 percent of its total GNP, more
than twice the United States rate of 18 percent, and Japan's
gross private investment in new plant and equipment during
this period was 20 percent of GNP while the U.S.'s was 10
percent [Ref. 17: p. 18]. In April, 1972, the Honorable
Charles H. Percy, member of the Subcommittee on Priorities
and Economy in Government, summarized the productivity
situation in three points:
1. It is essential to strengthen U.S. international
competitiveness which has been weakened by chroni-
cally low productivity rates. In the late 19 60's,
while Western European industrial nations increased
manufacturing output by 40 percent to 50 percent,
and Japan by 9 percent, U.S. manufacturing output
increased by only 10 percent.
2. After a short-term spurt in productivity growth as
the economy recovers, we can expect a continued
long-term drag on productivity growth as a result of
the trend from manufacturing to service industry and
government jobs where productivity is usually low.
3. Although we can expect business to increase its
investment in plant and equipment as a result of the
7 percent Investment Tax Credit and new depreciation
rules, the job of increasing productivity has become
complicated by changes in the nature of the American
work force. [Ref. 13: pp. 4-5]
The recession of 1974-75 aggravated an already poor
productivity showing and idled large amounts of productive
capacity. The concern for the lack of a consistent national
policy on productivity improvement resulted in the
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establishment of the National Center for Productivity in
19 75. The National Center for Productivity was intended to
continue the efforts of the National Commission on Produc-
tivity. Legislation establishing the National Center for
Productivity provided for multi-year funding authority which
the National Commission on Productivity never had. The
National Center for Productivity was to identify, encourage
and disseminate useful practices and techniques for enhancing
productivity growth in both public and private sectors as
well as functioning as a national focal point for produc-
tivity matters. A national focal point for productivity
is not a new idea. Practically every industrialized country
in the world has one. Some of these countries' centers were
established at the request of the United States as a precon-
dition to assistance under the Marshall Plan after World
War II.
Subsequently, in the 1970 's, stagflation took the
world by surprise. Double digit unemployment coupled with
double digit inflation prevented companies from making capi-
tal investments due to reduced cash flow and increased
uncertainty. By the mid 1970's, the productivity slowdown
was worsening, with the acceleration of inflation and world
oil prices contributing to the problem. The 94th Congress
attempted to sort out tax proposals designed to stimulate
capital investment, thereby improving productivity. The
95th Congress was also amenable to tax cuts. The Acting
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Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Mr.
James T. Mclntyre, Jr., strongly supported the budgeted $25
billion tax cut, a portion of which was directly targeted
to productivity improvements. The Honorable W. Michael
Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury, supported a 4 percent
tax cut in corporate tax rates and recommended that the ITC
(Investment Tax Credit) be made permanent.
In 19 76, Congressional hearings were held on Tax
Policy and Capital Formation by the Subcommittee on Finan-
cial Markets to analyze the effectiveness of present national
policy and recommend adjustments. Congress filled an
administrative gap by the Investment Policy Act of 19 77.
Its purpose was to enunciate a national policy on invest-
ment in the private sector of the United States economy.
In 19 78, the Council of Economic Advisors was still addressing
the magnitude of the uncorrected productivity problems. In
its annual report, the Council emphasized that the current
slowdown in U.S. productivity growth is still one of the
most significant problems of recent years. In its 19 79
report, the Joint Economic Committee reiterated that the
United States' poor productivity performance made significant
contributions to stagflation and that sound, long-run govern-
ment productivity improvement policies were the key to its
correction.
By the 19 80's, experience with productivity problems
had led the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to conclude in
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a study for the House Budget Committee that government poli-
cies can affect productivity growth but that the produc-
tivity problem is so all-encompassing that government should
not attempt to directly influence private decisions affect-
ing productivity. The CBO also warned against searching
for a single, all-inclusive productivity policy. The CBO






5. Impact of Government, and
6. Energy. [Ref. 18: p. XV-XVIJ
In fact, government has known of the advantages of
targeting these areas for years. For example, the Investment
Tax Credit was enacted in the early 1960 's to promote capi-
tal investment for productivity improvements. Education,
pay, and quality of working life initiatives were targeted
to motivate labor and improve productivity. Selective
government actions like Manufacturing Technology, increased
depreciation, military specifications reviews, and the
Commission on Government Paperwork attempt to promote effi-
cient technologies and minimize the adverse impact of govern-
ment on productivity improvement. Recently, the government
has begun to investigate more efficient means of harnessing
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energy and improving productivity. Therefore, the CBO
study's main contribution was its warning against attempting
to formulate a unified productivity policy.
Executive Order 12332 of 10 November 1981 maintained
the high national attention in the productivity arena by
establishing the National Productivity Advisory Committee
(NPAC) whose purpose is to be the national focal point on
matters relating to productivity. Subsequently in 19 83,
PL 97-367 authorized a National Conference on Productivity,
to be overseen by the NPAC, with the purpose of coordinating
the background, development, and recommendations on improving
productivity in the United States. These recommendations
are to be made by a cross section of business, labor, aca-
demic, and government individuals and organizations. Eleven
policy areas are outlined in PL97-367 for the conference
to "consider: reorganizing the Federal Government to promote
productivity improvements, promoting the benefits which re-
sult from implementing productivity improvement techniques,
improving the general training and skill level of American
labor, informing American businesses of foreign technology
developments, sharing government research with industry,
establishing awards for businesses and industries that make
improvements in productivity, revising the tax laws to im-
prove productivity, reviewing the effects of antitrust laws
on productivity, reviewing our patent laws, improving the
accuracy and reliability of productivity measures, and re-
vising federal civil service laws.
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These actions set the stage for a renewed emphasis
on productivity in the 1980 's. This revived fervor over
productivity was destined to affect the DOD since DOD exer-
cises control over the largest parcel of the government's
procurement monies. Senator John Tower told the Honorable
Caspar W. Weinberger during the Defense Secretary's nomination
hearings in January 19 81 that "these extra billions of dol-
lars buy so few planes, ships or missiles ... it (productivity)
has got to have more emhasis" [Ref. 19: p. 7]. The marching
orders were unmistakable; productivity is a prime issue.
And the emphasis came none too soon as the seriousness of
labor productivity at the time was echoed by Mr. James
Stillwill, Vice-President
—
Quality Assistance at McDonnell-
Douglas Corp., "...as much as 40 percent of the manufacturing
effort is expended in doing work over or completing something
that was left undone..." [Ref. 20: p. 50]. Additionally,
labor productivity problems in the U.S. auto manufacturing
industry are legendary. The Defense Industrial Base Panel
noted that the U.S. Aerospace industry invested in new capi-
tal assets at a rate of 2 percent of sales versus a U.S.
industry average of 8 percent in the last decade.
The DOD emphasis on productivity has paralleled
political interest. The DOD's emphasis has been concen-
trated into two main areas, intra-DOD (primarily capital
and labor) , and industrial base (primarily capital). . Peren-
nial political interest in weapon systems costs has also
maintained the DOD's interest, over the years, in productivity
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as a cost reduction tool. In 1966, Senator William Proxmire
chaired hearings of the Subcommittee on Federal Procurement
and Regulations which scrutinized DOD cost reduction pro-
grams initiated under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.
In 19 68, the Manufacturing Technology Advisory Group (MTAG)
was established by the DOD and included representatives from
the Air Force, Army, and Navy. This was an attempt to pur-
sue manufacturing efficiencies and/or productivity improvement
on a relatively small scale.
With the withdrawal from Vietnam came reduced DOD
budgets and associated problems and concerns with produc-
tivity and excess capacity. These problems made tracking
any attempts at productivity improvements within the DOD
difficult at best. In 19 72, military sepnding was again one
of the prime subjects on Capital Hill during hearings by
the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government
chaired by Senator William Proxmire. In these hearings, the
DOD was reprimanded for inefficiencies, and DOD spending was
labeled inflationary and targeted for deep cuts. In early
1976, the Investment Policy Study Group (IPSG) was formed
to identify factors other than profit which motivate con-
tractors to invest in productive and cost-efficient capital.
The IPSG backed the following studies, "Profit 76" Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) report 76-3, "Investment Policy
for Cost Reduction" LMI report 76-9, and "Defense Industrial
Base: Executive Summary" LMI report 76-2. In September
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19 79, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported to Con-
gress that "...there is no doubt that increased productivity
could reduce weapons costs" [Ref. 21: p. 31]. In 1979, the
GAO released a report to the Secretary of Defense emphasiz-
ing capital investment as a means to improve productivity
and reduce weapons systems costs. The GAO reiterated their
stand in a 19 81 report entitled "Incentive Programs to
Improve Productivity Through Capital Investments Can Work."
In 19 77 the DOD established the Productivity Enhance-
ment Incentive Fund (PEIF) . This fund was an attempt to
improve intra-DOD productivity and enabled the DOD to quickly
buy and install equipment that will pay back its cost in
two years or less. In this budget program it was not neces-
sary to identify specific projects for the funds prior to
budget submission. The rationale for this policy was that
any productive improvements must be made more quickly than
the budget process allowed. Congress terminated the pro-
gram in 19 78. Only upon GAO's urgings concerning its effec-
tiveness was it reinstated in 19 79.
General Alton D. Slay, USAF, Commander, Air Force
Systems Command, stated to the Defense Industrial Base Panel
that adequate capital is the key to productivity within the
DOD industrial base. His concern for productivity was ap-
parent when he said:
...as our productivity growth rate declines, U.S.
industry is less competitive and our world market
share declines. This declining competitiveness weakens
our dollar and further increases the cost of imports,
including oil and nonfuel minerals. This smaller
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market share coupled with a weakening dollar means
less capital for investment in productivity enhancing
technology and modern equipment to maintain our competi-
tiveness. This, in turn, leads to an even less competi-
tive world position. [Ref. 22: p. 445]
In 1981, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Honorable
Frank C. Carlucci, set forth the DOD Acquisition Improvement
Plan. Initiative number 5 of the plan is entitled "Encour-
age Capital Investment to Enhance Productivity" and is
indicative of the recent emphasis on the productivity of
the DOD industrial base.
DOD emphasis on productivity has progressed via
the establishment of the Office of Industrial Productivity,
in July 19 82, and is in consonance with the national thrust
through the White House Conference on Productivity. The
DOD controls a major portion of the federal government man-
power and expenditures and therefore is in a position to
provide a substantial contribution to the national concern.
The DOD has many ongoing areas of initiatives that address
the productivity problem. The areas of initiative are
targeted within DOD and the DOD industrial base. The major
initiative areas within DOD are: Productivity Enhancing
Capital Investment (PECI) , operational improvement/efficiency
review and resource determination, work force motivation,
productivity improvement integration into PPBS , and produc-
tivity measurement program. The major initiative areas
for the DOD industrial base are: test of the IMIP, produc-
tivity measurement, science and technology, Manufacturing
Technology, contract finance, patent, and technical data
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rights policies, elimination of non-cost effective contract
requirements, and quality in defense material acquisition.
4 . Summary
Productivity theory and application has advanced to
an indispensible level in today's society. Because produc-
tivity positively correlates to national concerns such as
inflation and standard of living, the future of its role in
government policy is bright. However, isolation of the
causes of the decline in productivity growth and how to
control productivity growth through government policy will
continue to be a challenge throughout the rest of this
century. The IMIP places productivity improvement as the
focal point for any change in the DOD acquisition environment,
Regardless of the causative factors, investment in new
capital equipment will generally improve productive effi-
ciency. This is the unique aspect of the IMIP, that it
is not a specific solution to a specific problem, but a
specific solution to a general problem whose causes are
uncertain.
C. RISING WEAPON SYSTEMS COSTS
1 . The Rising Weapons Cost Problem
Rising weapon systems costs within the DOD have
held a firm position in the American political limelight for
many years. Despite attempts to improve performance in the
weapon systems procurement area, the complexity of acqui-
sition and weapon systems always ensures that sufficient
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incidences of fraud, waste, abuse, and oversight can be
cited by political forces to indicate military waste and
negligence. This constant attention results in an organi-
zational determination by the DOD to rid itself of the rising
cost stigma. The unique political and economic conditions
of the 1970's and 1980*s have made this effort monumental,
if not impossible. The major weapon system acquisition
cycle consists of mission analysis, identification of need,
exploration of alternative systems, competitive demonstra-
tions, full scale development, test and evaluation produc-
tion, and deployment and operation. Each weapon system
acquisition is unique; no two are identical. There are
differences in time, cost, technology, management, and con-
tracting approaches. However, regardless of the differences,
the basic acquisition process above is common to all pro-
grams. Rising costs can occur in any part of the weapon
systems cycle.
The 19 72 Defense Authorization Report cited the
examples of rising weapon systems costs that are reproduced
in Table I. Table I illustrates the increases in unit costs
of standard weapon systems of each era.
2 . Components of the Problem
In 19 71, the Secretary of the Navy announced that
the Navy was considering building a new weapon system with
a unit cost in excess of $1 billion, the Nimitz class
nuclear aircraft carrier. This same aircraft carrier in





Weapon Date Unit Cost
M-3 Early 1940's $125,000
M-48 Early 1950's $175,000
M-60 Early 1960's $200,000
M-60A1E2 Early 1970's $500,000
MBT-70 Late 1970's $900,000
Fighter Aircraft
Weapon Date Unit Cost
P-51 Early 1940's $200,000
F-86 Late 1940's $400,000
F-100C Mid 1950's $1,100,000
F-104C Late 1950's $1,600,000
F-4B Early 1960's $3,500,000
F-15 Mid 1970's $9,000,000
The final cost of a weapon system is the result of
a conglomeration of system requirements, management deci-
sions, products delivered, economic considerations and
hardware/capability demanded. Some generally recognized
contributors to rising weapon systems costs in the Post-
Korean War industrial base have been:





3. Increased complexity and reliability,
4. Buy-ins and overruns, and
5. DOD profit policy.
As explained in the productivity section, any
inefficiency degrades productivity and therefore raises
costs. Inefficiencies can result due to inadequate organi-
zational structure and planning, inadequate cost estimating,
inadequate control systems or even inadequate or nonopti-
mally used production capacity. The General Accounting
Office in their study entitled "Impediments to Reducing the
Cost of Weapons Systems" conclude:
Even though most weapon systems are produced in
limited quantities, productivity improvements could
probably have a measurable effect on costs. United
States industry is facing a severe decline in produc-
tivity growth. The situation is possibly more serious
in the defense industry because of the lack of competition
and the profit policies that do not provide incentives
for capital investment. Continued experimentation and
emphasis on this problem is required. [Ref. 21: p. 31]
Inflation is an accepted factor in rising weapon
system costs. Rising costs of materials, labor, and over-
head are passed on to the consumer (DOD) . In fact, the
government makes specific allowances for inflation in-
creases in contracting via the Defense Acquisition Regula-
tions (DAR)
.
Increased complexity and reliability of weapon sys-
tems is a major reason for rising costs. For example the
C-141 cargo aircraft manufactured by Lockheed includes
250,00 parts and approximately 20,0 00 engineering blue-
prints. In contrast, a 1972 automobile had about 3,000
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parts. The Apollo Command and Service Moduels boasted a
reliability of 9 70 hours Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
while the average MTBF for cars is around 9 hours [Ref. 23,
p. 23-24]
.
A "buy-in" refers to an intentional attempt of a
contractor to secure defense work through Government con-
tracting procedures by submitting a bid with estimated costs
which the contractor has little likelihood of attaining.
A buy- in philosophy takes advantage of a well-known weakness
in the defense acquisition environment which makes trans-
ferring defense work away from a defaulting contractor a
risky and expensive proposition. It is expensive to trans-
fer technology due to weapon system complexity. Expenses
result due to the costs incurred in physically transferring
the technology, start-up of a new production line, and
delaying deployment of a new weapon system. Risk is asso-
ciated with complete and timely transfer of technology.
Although buy-ins were fairly apparent on some famous weapon
systems acquisitions such as the C-5A and the 1052 class
frigate, it is virtually impossible to prevent for two
reasons. First, proof of legal intent to buy-in is diffi-
cult and entails a comprehensive review of a contractor's
facility, similar to a "Should-Cost" analysis which is ex-
pensive and time consuming. Second, the DOD has generally
been willing to ignore cost underestimates in order to
present lower projected systems costs to Congress.
75

The late Mr. Gordon Rule, a well-respected and
legendary acquisition expert, testified on the difficulty
of handling buy-ins to the Subcommittee on Priorities and
Economy in Government
:
Chairman Proximire: As to the wisdom of these two
methods of procurement, let me ask Mr. Rule if you
would comment on the performance of the Navy in rela-
tionship to the (1052) buy-in.
Mr. Rule: Senator, buy-in is a real tough nut, espe-
cially in these ship contracts. They were advertised
procurements (sic). They weren't negotiated. They
were straight formal advertised bids where the low man
takes it. Avondale (shipyards) was low, I think. There
is nothing in ASPR that says how or when you disqualify
a man for a buy-in. There is really no guidance on it.
Everybody talks about it a great deal as being a poor
thing, and it is, but about the only way you can get at
it is if somebody has guts enough to refuse to make what
has to be made; namely, an affirmative determination that
a contractor is responsible, if you think he is buying-
in you have to make this determination before you get a
contract. If a contracting officer with guts will re-
fuse to make that determination this would surface one
of these cases and see what we can do about it (sic)
.
Chairman Proxmire: Well, then, your assertion in your
report there may have been a buy-in simply goes to that
fact that you can't do anything about this situation now
but in the future these should be challenged where
there may well be a question as to the capacity of the
contractor to perform at this price?
Mr. Rule: That is right. [Ref. 24: p. 1266]
A buy-in inevitably leads to costs being incurred over and
above the budgeted amount, thereby contributing to rising
weapon systems costs.
DOD profit policy is a well established contributor
to rising costs. This cost-based profit policy results in
a tendency for increased costs on the contractor's part to
achieve increased profits. Supporting studies and reform
attempts in this area are presented in a subsequent section
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3 . Chronology of Rising Weapon Systems Costs
The development of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
since World War II is a history of military organizations
battling for strategic missions, recognition, support, and
budget funding. The entire defense effort after that was
inefficient and and disorderly. Defense strategy was left
in disarray with the buildup of nuclear weapons after World
War II. Each service bargained for a share of the nuclear
mission, while attempting to maintain their traditional
missions which were being labeled obsolete in view of pro-
jected nuclear war scenarios. This unsatisfactory situation
of having nebulously defined mission roles obviously lends
itself to inefficiencies, since each service was independently
formulating their own threats, devising weapon systems to
counter their perceived threats, and budgeting dollars for
the efforts. All this continued to occur despite the
National Security Act of 194 7 which created a centralized
control point for the military services in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and created the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) as a multi-service strategic planning agency.
Although James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense,
and President Eisenhower achieved many goals in organization
and control of the DOD and the military services ' strategic
planning, there still remained a split between strategic
policy and budgeting in 1960. With this split the services
were free to continue their inefficient expenditure on
perceived missions and threats.
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By the time Robert S. McNamara took office in 19 61
as Secretary of Defense, the costly areas of weapon systems
duplication by the military services were rampant. Budget
ceilings appeared to be the only constraint on weapon sys-
tems costs and even then did not guarantee sensible alloca-
tion. McNamara implemented the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) to bridge the planning and budgeting
gap, and he established sound cost analyses to improve
budget projections.
Robert S. McNamara made significant strides in
consolidating and streamlining the defense organization and
operation. He established the DOD Cost Reduction Program
which concentrated efforts in three policy areas, buying
only what we need, buying at the lowest sound price, and
reducing operating costs. Through these efforts a basic
management system was put in place which could provide con-
trol of national defense strategy, subsequent program budgets
and budget projections by statistical analysis versus "gut
feelings .
"
McNamara also attacked the problems of gold-plating
and acquisition procedures. His efforts to reduce gold-
plating are exemplified by his substitution of a $2 molded
plastic turbine wheel for a $175 stainless steel one used in
a generator of a nuclear weapon system. This approach to
cost reduction became officially implemented as a DOD pro-
gram in 1963 called "Value Engineering." Value Engineering
involves functional analysis of items and, then, engineering
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item performance to achieve the function at the lowest over-
all cost consistent with performance, reliability, quality,
and maintainability requirements. The DOD Value Engineering
program is defined for applications within DOD as well as
for defense industrial base contractors. The motivator for
contractors to participate in the Value Engineering program
is a share in the realized savings. Savings of over $7
billion have been attributed to Value Engineering efforts
since its official inception.
The vast growth in weapon systems complexity since
the 1950' s resulted in an undesirable increase in the use
of noncompetitive Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contracts since
parameters (and hence costs) are hard to define in the con-
tract definition cycle. CPFF contracts are recognized as a
disincentive for contractor economy because they guarantee
a specific profit to the contractor yet deemphasize the
contractor's planning, cost analysis and control, and budget-
ing accountability. McNamara ' s ultimate goal was to reduce
CPFF contracts from over 25 percent of total contract awards
to 12.3 percent by 1965. Competitive procurement was targeted
to be increased to 40 percent of all contracts awarded in
1965 from about 36 percent in Fiscal Year 1962.
Due to these apparent achievements in organization
and cost reduction, the DOD found itself in good standing in
19 66 hearings before the Subcommittee on Federal Procurement
and Regulation of the Joint Economic Committee. These
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hearings were chaired by Senator Paul H. Douglas and scru-
tinized the DOD Cost Reduction Program. However, the cost-
conscious reputation which the DOD enjoyed was even then
being undone. In response to questioning on Total Package
Procurement (TPP) from Representative Thomas B. Curtis, the
Honorable Robert S. McNamara stated:
One of the most encouraging developments in this area
of increasing competition in our procurement during
the last year has been the evolution of the 'Total
Package' contracting concept which we have recently
applied to the C-5A transport aircraft program... In my
judgement, the C-5A award represents a major breakthrough
in contracting techniques ... I think it was probably the
largest single development and production contract ever
awarded at one time. [Ref. 24: pp. 18-19]
Although Executive and Legislative branches were
implicated in pressuring the C-5A contract award to Lockheed
instead of Boeing (who was judged by contract review authori-
ties as being best qualified) , blame for subsequent weapon
systems costs overruns, the largest in history, were laid
squarely upon DOD shoulders.
In 1967, the first "Should-Cost" review was per-
formed by the Navy at the direction of the Secretary of
Defense. The Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) define
"Should-Cost" as:
...a concept of contract pricing that employs an inte-
grated team of Government procurement, contract admin-
istration, audit, and engineering representatives to
conduct a coordinated, in-depth cost analysis at the
contractor's plant. The purpose is (1) to identify un-
economical or inefficient practices in the contractor's
management and operations and to quantify the findings
in terms of their impact on cost, and (2) to develop a
realistic price objective which reflects reasonably
achievable economies and efficiencies.
[Ref. 25: Section I, Para. 337.2]
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This first "Should-Cost" effort was accomplished by a team
of 4 3 Government engineers; auditors; contract administra-
tors; and cost, price, and management analysts. The effort
took 3 months, cost about $300,000 and savings claimed were
about $100 million. The GAO attributes the demise of the
"Should-Cost" approach to lack of time and availability of
technically skilled personnel to accomplish it effectively,
despite the apparent cost-effectiveness of the program.
By 1969, rising weapon systems costs were becoming
a major problem for DOD. With the scrutiny accompanying
the C-5A disaster, all major defense programs were reviewed
and numerous time and cost overruns were brought to light.
Political interest in defense contractor profits,
as one aspect of rising weapon systems costs, was growing.
This interest sparked studies by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) and the Logistics Management Institute (LMI)
and peaked in 1971 with congressional hearings on the sub-
ject. The thrust of the hearings were well summarized by
Chairman William Proxmire:
It seems to me that there can no longer be a ques-
tion of whether or not profits on defense contracts
are too high. In many cases—not all cases, but in
many cases—defense profits are too high. The report
of the General Accounting Office and the testimony of
individuals such as Admiral Rickover make that point
crystal clear. [Ref. 26: p. 92]
The DOD recognized that the cost estimation proce-
dures for weapon systems established under McNamara left
much to be desired and it took several actions. First, in
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May 19 69, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Fackard established the Defense
System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) within OSD to
advise the Secretary of Defense on the status and readi-
ness of each major defense system to proceed from one pro-
gram phase to the next in its life cycle and other selected
programs.
Secondly, the Deputy Director of Research and Develop-
ment was requested to conduct a management review at least
once on each major acquisition program. The Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense then promulgated policy on cost growth
stating:
Cost Growth is the net change of an estimated or actual
amount from a base figure previously established ... The
events causing 'cost growth 1 must then be identified by
one or more of the following categories and the appro-
priate amount of each shown as 'estimated' or 'actual.'
These categories do not necessarily determine whether
the cost growth could have been avoided by the govern-
ment or contractor or both. They provide the essential
visibility and information required to determine the
cause of the cost growth. [Ref . 27: p. 1]
The policy statement continued by defining nine categories
of cost growth changes to be recognized and quantified in
cost growth reports. These categories are: engineering,
quantity, support, schedule, unpredictable, economic, esti-
mating, contract performance incentives, and contract cost
overrun (underrun) changes.
Thirdly, in 1970, the Fitzhugh Commission highly
recommended the fly-before-buy procurement policy for major
weapon systems procurement. The Commission was established
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by the President to probe into the procurement problems and
wasteful practices of the DOD. This recommended policy
conformed well to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's new
policy of full-scale prototyping. Full-scale prototyping
was the successor to the ill-fated TPP concept.
Fourthly, in 1971, the DOD implemented the "design
to cost" concept which entailed designing weapons with
emphasis on what was affordable. The concept was implemented
sparingly and, although useful, did not appear to have pro-
duced a measurable impact in controlling weapon systems costs
due to the difficulty in establishing weapon systems capa-
bilities, objectives, and associated costs.
Finally, the Secretary of Defense sent a memo, dated
2 5 January 19 72, to the Secretaries of the Military Depart-
ments regarding cost estimating for Major Defense Systems.
The memo officially established the DOD Cost Analysis Im-
provement Group (CAIG) whose mission was to provide the
DSARC with independent evaluative capability on major de-
fense system programs. This action gave DOD the in-house
capability to analyze weapon systems cost information sub-
mitted by the services in the PPBS process.
These actions were being taken in the shadow of the
Commission on Government Procurement, which was a biparti-
san commission established by PL 91-129 in 1970 and composed
of 12 members. Its charter was to recommend a reform
package which would help prevent the uncontrolled growth in
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weapon systems costs. The Commission's report was submitted
to Congress on 31 December 1972 and contained one hundred
forty-nine recommendations in twelve areas which called for
more highlighting of key organizational decisions, better
organizational role definition, and more program visibility
to Congress. Subsequent hearings before the Subcommittee
on Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency, and Open Govern-
ment of the Committee on Government Operations in June and
July of 19 75 reviewed these recommendations for feasibility
prior to implementation.
The Cost Accounting Standards Board was established
in 1970 to bring uniformity and consistency to accounting
for weapon systems costs by contractors. Its effect in
controlling rising weapon systems costs is uncertain.
However, the Cost Accouting Standards certainly provided an
organized framework from which to view the rising costs.
In May and June of 1972 the Subcommittee on Priori-
ties and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee
held hearings on National Priorities. The general consensus
of the hearings was that military spending is inflationary
and should be cut.
In March 1973, The Defense Science Board released a
report by the Task Force on Reducing Cost of Defense Systems
Acquisition "Design to Cost, Commercial Practice vs. DOD
Practice." The report found that in the commercial sector,
there are incentives for cost reduction, but DOD's cost based
84

profit policy did not encourage cost reduction and therefore
contributed to rising weapon systems costs.
In June 19 73, DOD Directive 5000.4 provided a per-
manent charter for, and assigned the CAIG as, an advisory
body to the DSARC on matters relating to program cost and
as a focal point for the DOD staff and component cost analysts
activities.
The Fitzhugh Commission Report identified specific
reform actions. However, there was little support for the
report due to serious attacks upon its validity. The Sub-
committee on Federal Spending Practices, Efficiency and Open
Government, chaired by a fiery Senator Lawton Chiles, re-
fused to let the Commission report die and pushed through a
bill to establish the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
(OFPP) to provide a permanent vehicle for change.
By May 19 75, continued weapon systems cost growth
prompted DOD Directive 5000.28 "Design to Cost." The inten-
tion was to reemphasize costs by establishing cost as a
parameter equal in importance with technical programs and
schedules throughout design, development, and production.
Additionally DOD Directive 5000.28 identified cost elements
as goals for program managers and contractors. This resur-
gence of the "Design to Cost" concept and the emphasis on
cost as a weapon system program parameter has made "Design
to Cost" an integral part of the weapon systems acquisition
procedures. Initiative number 22 of the DOD Acquisition
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Improvement Plan (AIP) , "Provide more appropriate Design to
Cost Goals," is an initiative to install design trade-off
studies as the basis for payment of award fees. Previously,
award fees were paid prior to establishment of actual unit
production cost. Initiative number 22 seeks to tie award
fee payment to the actual production costs achieved.
In April 1976, OMB Circular A-109 entitled "Major
Systems Acquisition" promulgated criteria and special manage-
ment reporting instructions for major systems. A major
defense program was defined as one in which estimated costs
for RDT&E and procurement on the program exceeded $100 million
and/or $500 million respectively. These parameters were
raised to $200 million and $1 billion respectively.
This proliferation of reactive remedies to specific
procurement system deficiencies prompted Dr. Richard D.
Delauer, Chairman of the Acquisition Cycle Task Force of
the Defense Science Board to state:
The progression of acquisition policy changes from
Total Package Procurement through the DSARC process,
fly-before-buy, full-scale prototyping, increased em-
phasis on operational test and evaluation, and up to
the current OMB Circular A-109 policy, has evolved out
of the perceived need to correct the deficiencies ob-
served in specific programs by introducing additional
management review and decision procedural checkpoints
to assure that past mistakes would not be repeated.
These procedural changes have become institutionalized
and have ben applied inflexibly to all programs with
the result that the acquisition process has steadily
lengthened and the procurement of defense systems has
become increasingly costly.
Lack of realism in estimation of program costs,
changes in specified performance requirements, infla-
tion, and other such causes of "cost growth" have
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caused the aggregate cost of planned production
programs to substantially exceed the allocated budget-
ary resources, resulting in the need to delay the com-
pletion of the production phase of programs in order to
fit the total available defense budget in each fiscal
year. The "bow wave" effect created by too many pro-
grams in full scale development at any given time in
relation to the available production funds results in
an acquisition cycle for the typical defense system
which is an excess of the optimum length of time and is
more costly than planned or estimated. [Ref. 28: p. 1]
Considering the program instability inherent in
government weapon systems contracts, a major concern was
for defense contractor's long term facilities investment
protection. Investment protection provides an arrangement
whereby the government reimburses the contractor for fixed
capital assets procured for the contract in event of prema-
ture termination or significant reductions in buys. Although
this has been available to contractors for years, recent
changes by DOD have increased the use of this valuable con-
tracting tool. In 19 77, the DOD promulgated policy guide-
lines and methods to protect both government and contractor
interests. Additionally, under the IMIP, nonseverable capital
assets are being included in the termination protection.
This action was taken to stimulate contractor investment in
cost efficient capital assets for the purpose of reducing
weapon systems costs.
By 19 79, the General Accounting Office (GAO) had
issued a report entitled "Impediments to Reducing the Cost
of Weapons Systems" in which they presented the major drivers
for rising weapons systems costs as attempts to deploy systems
87
\
with new technology and high performance, low rates of pro-
duction due to budget constraints and desires to maintain
active production bases as long as possible, absence of price
competition between contractors, lack of real motivation on
the part of contractors to reduce costs, the impact of
socioeconomic programs, Government controls and red tape,
and a nationwide problem of reduced research and development
expenditures and lessening productivity.
The GAO recognized major DOD efforts to reduce
costs such as design to cost, value engineering, Manufactur-
ing Technology, Should-Cost analyses and revised profit
policies, but emphasized that these programs do not address
the principle factors which were driving .costs upward. The
GAO found that the desire for high technology and budget
constraints which lead to uneconomical procurement and pro-
duction practices were the two principle cost drivers. The
GAO recommended that Congress examine lower cost options before
approving new weapons programs, explore with senior mili-
tary officials the advantages of larger quantities of alterna-
tive weapons versus smaller numbers of high-technology
systems (High-Low Mix concept) , consider multi-year funding
in order to take advantage of economical production prac-
tices, and take the initiative to respond to recommendations
of the Commission on Government Procurement. The GAO further
recommended that the Secretary of Defense complete a study
to identify aspects of contract administration to be eliminated
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or reduced to lower costs, and take stronger / initiatives to
implement policies in OMB Circular A-109
.
In 1981, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honor-
able Frank C. Carlucci, promulgated a series of initiatives
collectively known as the DOD Acquisition Improvement Plan
(AIP) . The AIP action was undertaken at the specific instruc-
tion of the Defense Industrial Base Panel of the House
Committee on Armed Services. The AIP's purpose is to further
refine the acquisition process with a primary objective of
reducing costs associated with weapon systems acquisition
administration and hardware. The four objective areas
targeted by the AIP, are reduce acquisition cost, shorten
acquisition time, improve weapons support and readiness,
and improve the DSARC process. The AIP charts major improve-
ments in every aspect of the PPBS and is the most compre-
hensive DOD management reform plan undertaken since the
McNamara era.
The Honorable Mr. Carlucci demonstrated his deter-
mination to ensure effectiveness of AIP implementation by
appointing the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisi-
tion Management), to head the Task Force on Acquisition Im-
provement. The Task Force was chartered 17 November 19 81
to evaluate progress on each of the AIP's actions, identify
barriers to implementation and to recommend corrective action
to OSD for problem areas.
In December 1981, the Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
asserted that the DOD will "...demonstrate to the American
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taxpayer that we can and will manage our large, complex, and
critically needed defense establishment in a prudent and
business-like manner" [Ref. 29: p. 10]. This statement
by the Secretary of Defense illustrates the intensity with
which the latest reform movement is being implemented.
4 . Summary
Amid the myriad of attempts to control weapon sys-
tems costs, it is difficult to say whether costs have truly
been brought under control. The cost overruns of the late
19 60 's and early 19 70's appear to have subsided. However,
inflation has very recently subsided also. The DOD has
instituted programs to budget to cost and stricter organi-
zational channels for managing weapon systems acquisition
have been implemented. Perhaps the last two decades of
reform, attempts only now are beginning to take root in the
massive acquisition bureaucracy. The warning of Dr. John
S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
is clear, unless the Government and the defense industry
change the way they are doing business "...the things
(industry) sells and (the Government) wants to buy will grow
too expensive to provide an adequate national defense under
limited funding" [Ref. 30: p. 77].
•
D. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
1 . United States--Industrial Base Relationships
The industrial base of the United States consists of
the aggregate of manufacturing or technically productive
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enterprises contributing to the U.S. economy. The govern-
ment-industry relationship can be viewed as consisting of
actions and reactions to stimuli on both sides as well as
to uncontrollable economic considerations. The government
uses monetary, fiscal, and legislative policy to stimulate
the industrial base.
2 . Economic Theory
In general, the economic theory of competitive
markets will predict the size, structure, composition, and
health of the industrial base. Competition is the means by
which the vitality of the industrial base is maintained;
enterprises with inefficient production or obsolete products
are forced out of operation by businesses with new products
or lower costs.
Theoretically, the Defense Industrial Base (DIB1
is maintained in the same manner. However, due to the govern-
ment's relationship to the DIB and its unique requirements
and considerations, the DIB's vitality becomes largely a
product of the government's policies on taxes, DOD profit
policy, and acquisition policy. The government attempts
to maintain arms-length transactions when dealing with the
DIB. However, the government's socioeconomic and adminis-
trative requirements frequently make this difficult. These
requirements cover safety, environmental, health, energy,
equal opportunity, and other areas. For example, government
allows small and minority business considerations to override
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cost. In determining whether a contractor is "responsible,"
it may take hundreds of government employees to examine the
organizational structure and operations. In major systems
acquisition, political considerations can override all
others in determining which sections of the industrial base
will benefit from the DOD requirements. Appendix 2 is
reproduced from "The Defense Industry" to illustrate differ-
ences between the defense market and a free market.
3. DIB Definition
The DIB can be defined as "...those companies that
supply the military needs of the peacetime armed services"
[Ref. 31: p. 1] . It can be viewed as consisting of two
basic groups of contractors; defense-oriented and non-defense-
oriented. Defense-oriented contractors are those who derive
a majority of their sales from defense contracts. Non-
defense-oriented contractors are those who derive a majority




During the early 1940 's, the war effort kept employ-
ment acceptable, sufficient capital resources were available
and flowing into the industrial base, and the responsiveness
of the DIB to changing military needs was good due to the
resources available and the simplicity of the product lines.
It is difficult to conceptualize the immense operations of
the DIB. In 1943 alone, the U.S. Navy took possession of
1700 ships and 14000 warplanes. These statistics represented
only two weapon systems for one service.
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After the war, the DIB diversified rapidly to sup-
port the peacetime national needs. The DIB surged again
during the Korean War and it began to present a new face
to the political mainstream. Expenditures grew from $13 to
$50 billion during the period 1950-54 to finance the war.
President Eisenhower coined the term "Military-Industrial
Complex" (MIC) to describe a new order of society which had
evolved since 194 5. MIC theorists believe that:
...prlonged international conflict since 1945 has
produced high levels of military expenditures which
have created powerful domestic groups who require a
cold war ideology in order to guard their power and
prestige within the state's political and economic
structure. These groups occupy powerful positions
within the state; they are mutually supportive, and, on
defense-related matters, their influence exceeds that
of any existing countervailing coalitions or interests.
[Ref. 32: p. 5]
The ability of the armed forces to exercise control
over the political spectrum has long concerned policy makers.
In fact, it is the primary reason that the military was
subordinated to civilian control in the Constitution of
the U.S. MIC theory espouses that military and industry have
a direct hand in formulating policy and direct access to
resources with which to take essentially independent actions.
5. DIB Health
Although empirical studies indicate the relationships
through which government and the DIB interact, they do not
describe the exact condition of the DIB. However, the state
of the DIB has historically been directly correlated with
the level of expenditures in the defense sector. The decline
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in military expenditures which followed every military
buildup (WW II, Korea, and Vietnam) inevitably induce
criticisms regarding the weakening ability of the armed
forces to deter aggression and carry out their other missions
During peace and wartime it is difficult to determine the
exact amount of defense to fund. It is no great surprise,
then, that the latest surge in interest for the welfare of
the DIB occurred simultaneously with the reduction of mili-
tary spending after the Vietnam conflict.
6 . The Declining DIB Problem
The difficulty of attacking DIB problems is in
identifying the exact nature of the problem. Lately, con-
cerns for the state of the industrial base have cited the
sharply increased delivery times sparked by increased defense
procurements to support their claim. However, increased
weapon systems complexity alone could account for this
phenomenon. This "erosion" was based upon single procurement
problems such as the M60A1 tank turret in 19 73. Mr. Harold
E. Bertrand of the LMI explains this problem succinctly:
To industry, from which the army had been procuring
approximately 360 sets of tank castings annually, it
was simply sound business to convert excess foundry
capacity to other uses or to divest itself of the unused
facilities. [Ref. 31: p. 1]
The harsh economic environment combined with the productivity
problems have exacerbated the DIB situation.
Mr. Bertrand points out that the industrial base is
in a constant state of flux, reacting to stimulus from the
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government and the commercial sectors in various fashions.
If industrial base behavior is not considered in planning
and budgeting, then it will be impossible to extract the
most efficiency from the DIB. The thrust of government
initiatives in the 19 70's and 19 80's has been to place




It is generally assumed that the industrial base has
declined over and above that caused by decreasing defense
expenditures due to the incentives in the DOD profit policy.
A study by the LMI explained this paradox:
The acquisition of facilities that increase effi-
ciency may affect the ability to obtain a contract.
Under the present rules, however, if a contractor can
get the business without additional facilities invest-
ment, he can expect more dollars, and a higher percent-
age of profit on invested capital by refraining from
investment as much as possible and allowing or causing
expected costs to be as high as will be acceptable.
Many defense contractors are aware of this paradox and
have told us that they consequently avoid facility in-
vestments whenever possible.
Percentages of profit on net book value of plant and
operating capital (equity plus debt less facilities and
outside investments) should be included in the weighted
guidelines for determining profit objectives. The
present percentages on labor, material and overhead
costs and the percentages to be applied to the capital
elements should be adjusted as necessary to accomplish
overall DOD profit objective policies. [Ref. 33: p. 10J
Additonally, a Rand Corporation study in 19 68 agreed that
the "...U.S. discriminates against capital intensive
firms" [Ref. 15: p. 45J
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A special subcommittee was established in December
19 67 by the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)
Committee to consider the LMI recommendation. The ASPR
Committee was part of the Office of the Assistance Secretary
of Defense (Installations & Logistics) and was responsible
for developing any needed amendments of ASPR. The special
subcommittee was given the specific task to develop and
test procedures for giving greater weight in prenegotiation
profit objectives to capital employed, evaluate the results
of the test, and if appropriate, recommend any needed changes
to the ASPR Committee.
The subcommittee issued a report dated 15 March 19 68
presenting a test plan and procedures for developing infor-
mation on Contractor Capital Employed (CCE) in contract
performance. After further study, in October 19 68, the
proposal was presented to a panel of the Defense Industry
Advisory Council which was chartered to explore ways and
means to foster and maintain a healthy defense industrial
base. (The Defense Industry Advisory Council was established
in 19 6 2 to provide a means for direct and regular contact
between the Secretary of Defense and his management assis-
tants and knowledgeable industry representatives.)
Subsequently, in June 1969, the Defense Industry
Advisory Council recommended to the Secretary of Defense that
in addition to other costs, DOD profit policy should recog-
nize and provide for adequate return on company capital
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employed. A new ASPR subcommittee was established in October
1970 which distributed for comment draft forms for gather-
ing preliminary data on Contractor Capital Employed. In
1972, DOD profit policy was officially revised to Contractor
Capital Employed (CCE) policy. Profit was based on con-
tractor input to total performance (CITF) and 50 percent on
risk and capital investment. Capital investment percentage
of profit depended on contract type and amount of risk asso-
ciated with it and was found by using these parameters in a
table lookup format. The CCE profit policy was not imple-
mented on a firm basis and was never fully subscribed to by
the DOD. Therefore the objective of motivating contractors
to invest in capital equipment was not achieved.
In March 19 72, DOD profit policy and its limitations
were presented by Mr. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Staff Assistant,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense:
The two basic objectives of the DOD profit on
capital policy are
1. To attract adequate capital to assure an effi-
cient and responsive industrial base for nation-
al security.
2. To reduce the overall cost of weapons by provid-
ing incentives for industry to invest in modern
efficient equipment and facilities.
There are a number of problems with our present
cost-based profit policy which have been emphasized in
various studies and the recent GAO defense industry
profit study. Firstly, the current profit policy fails
to provide positive incentives for contractors to in-
vest in efficient cost reducing facilities. This argu-
ment goes as follows: prior to negotiation, the contractor
target profit varies directly with the cost estimate.
As the cost estimate goes up, so does the profit and
conversely, as the cost estimate goes down, the profit
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goes down also... it is safe to say that the current
profit policy frequently provides only a penalty for a
capital investment when it should be providing a reward.
Another weakness of our cost-based profit policy is
that it results in inequities in profit on capital op-
portunity among contractors with different capital re-
quirements. Simply by failing to consider capital the
DOD can place itself in the embarassing position of
having profits negotiated on two different contracts
which are equal when measured as a percentage of cost
but grossly unequal when measured as a percentage on
capital because the contracts have different capital
requirements. [Ref. 34: p. 1]
This concept led to successive changes in DOD profit
policy to improve the basic incentives. These changes are
discussed in the next section.
Due to the severe economic climate in the 19 70's,
additional incentives were needed to encourage contractor
investment in upgraded capital equipment. The ITC, taxes,
and other tangential policies to provide incentives for
capital investments and maintenance of the industrial base
were examined.
In 19 75, the Honorable W.P. Clements, Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense, initiated the "Profit 76" study which would,
by examination of DOD profit policy, provide recommendations
to encourage industry investment in capital equipment. At
the same time, concerns about an impending capital shortage
were becoming widespread. The concern was that, in the cur-
rent recession, government borrowing may crowd out a substan-
tial volume of private sector borrowing. This would further
inhibit capital improvements in industry. An extensive
examination of investment requirements and savings flow at
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the time was conducted by Dusenberry and Bosworth. This
study concluded that a capital shortage can be barely avoided
[Ref . 43: p. 5]
.
In June and July of 19 75 the House Ways and Means
Committee held hearings on tax reform. The recurring recom-
mendations at the hearings were to shorten the period of
capital cost recovery, increase the ITC, reduce capital gains
tax, and eliminate double taxation of corporate income by
making dividends deductible.
On 1 July 1975 Cost Accounting Standard 409, "Depre-
ciation of Tangible Capital Equipment," became effective.
Contrary to the direction of policy making at that time, it
was believed that CAS 409 would reduce profits on defense
contracts since it forced the contractor to depreciate capital
assets on defense contracts in a manner which must "...reflect
the pattern of consumption of services over the life of the
asset" [Ref. 35: Sec. 409.40(a)(3)]. This effectively dis-
allowed defense contractors from using accelerated deprecia-
tion methods and charging the higher expense to government
contracts. The move was consistent, however, with the Cost
Accounting Standard Board's (CASB) charter to provide uni-
formity and consistency in accounting for defense contracts.
In 1976, Defense Procurement Circular (DPC) 76-3
promulgated new DOD policy as a result of the "Profit 76"
study. It implemented CAS 414, "Cost of Money as an Element
of the Cost of Facilities Capital," and established a weighted
guideline for facilities investment at six to ten percent
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of the contract fee. The DOD initially objected to this
increase in profits under CAS 414, which allowed interest
expense on capital employed, and they revised their profits
down to negate its effect. Additionally, under DPC 76-3,
the weight of contractor performance was reduced from 65
percent to 50 percent, cost risk weight was increased to 4
percent from 30 percent, and several other factors were
eliminated. Subsequently, Defense Acquisition Circular
(DAC) 76-11 revised the DAR to include sections 1-213,
"Capital Investment by Contractors," and section 3-815 which
dealt with capital investment special termination buyback
provisions. Defense Acquisition Circular (DAC) 76-23 in-
creased facilities investment Weighted Guideline (WGL) to
sixteen to twenty percent. This increase was programmed at
the outset of the facilities investment WGL concept to
follow an administrative period of implementation and was
strongly supported by the GAO. DAC 76-23 established a
separate profit weight for research and development, and
service contracts. It also eliminated the DOD * s practice
of negotiating profit downward to negate the effects of CAS
414 cash flow.
In 19 77, the concern for the DIB broadened beyond
profit policy to include government procurement practices
as a whole. Mr. Jacques Gansler, Vice-President of the
Analytic Sciences Corporation, in hearings before the Joint




Thus in many important areas, the effect has been
that those few remaining suppliers are in a monopolis-
tic position, and thereby able to rapidly raise prices,
and to dictate delivery times. These price increases
should, by traditional economic theory, result in large
numbers of companies rushing to enter this market.
Price increases of 300 to 500 percent in one year have
been observed.
However, no such 'rush' has been found. It is hy-
pothesized that this is attributable to the 'Barriers
to Entry' that the DOD has created through its procure-
ment practices—that is, military specifications; pre-
ferred parts' lists; small quantities; annual
procurements; and low profit. [Ref. 36: p. 62]
In 1978, the government reduced the maximum capital
gains tax to increase industrial base profits with the
intention of encouraging capital reinvestment.
Subsequently, the GAO found in a 19 79 study that the
new DOD policy initiated under DPC 76-3 resulted in higher
profits negotiated with some contractors without any demon-
strable reduction in costs to the government. The GAO found
little indication that contractors had responded positively
to DOD ' s attempts to encourage greater investments in new
or upgraded plant and equipment which would have lowered
production costs.
The GAO attributed this lack of success primarily
to the limited emphasis given to facilities investments in
establishing the government's prenegotiation profit objectives
The GAO found that, although the new profit policy
had not encouraged contractors to increase their investments
in cost-reducing facilities, it had resulted in the nego-
tiation of higher profit rates on an overall basis. This
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was contrary to DOD ' s intent at the time [Ref. 37: pp. 1-
18] .
In 19 80, a report entitled "Payoff 80" was completed
by Headquarters, Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) examining
productivity, manufacturing, and other industrial base
issues critical to the long term economic and military
strength of the United States. This Task Force formally
endorsed the Air Force's "Technology Modernization" concept,
which was initiated in the F-16 program contract. "Tech
Mod" was to become the spark and framework for the IMIP.
In July 19 80, the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) held hearings entitled "Capability of the United
States Industrial Base." The HASC was presented with the
problems of declining productivity and the shrinking indus-
trial base. The major contributors to the declining indus-
trial base were cited as inflation, tax policy, productivity
decline, and DOD profit policy. Inflation was recognized
as a semi-controllable factor which would be dealt with over
a period of years with monetary and fiscal policy. Capital
investment appeared to be a logical solution to upgrade the
industrial base. The disincentives to investment that the
contractor experienced in DOD business were:
1. depreciation periods based upon useful life,
2. unallowability of interest expense, and
3. program instability.
The disincentives to capital investment due to the
useful life depreciation restriction were partially removed
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by the Economic Tax Recovery Act of 19 81 which allowed the
following depreciation schedule for tax purposes: buildings--
10 years, equipment— 5 years, and vehicles— 3 years.
The disincentive to investment that the contractor
experienced due to unallowability of interest expense was
intended to be removed under CAS 414. However, as mentioned
above, the DOD objected to the profit which would be given
to the contractor under this Standard and promptly reduced
the profit on contracts to negate its effect until the issu-
ance of DAC 76-23.
The major area of disincentives to be addressed was
program instability. The Report of the Defense Industrial
Base Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, which followed
the Industrial Base Capability hearings, recommended, in
part, that the HASC favorably consider legislation to estab-
lish a flexible defense procurement policy which will result
in the acquisition of weapon systems and other items in the
most timely economic and efficient manner, specifically
authorize multi-year contracting, and make provisions for
advance procurements of components, repair parts, and
materials in the most effective economic lot purchases and
efficient production rates.
In response to these and other recommendations, the
Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
established the DOD Acquisition Process Working Group.
Their summary recommendations for economy and efficiency in
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defense systems acquisition became the basis for the thirty-
two Carlucci initiatives promulgated in mid-19 81.
In April 19 81 the GAO released a study entitled
"Incentive Programs to Improve Productivity Through Capital
Investments Can Work" which further spurred national atten-
tion to capital investments as a key to solving the problems
of productivity, costs, and the stat of the industrial base
In May 19 81 the DOD Task Force to improve Industrial
Responsiveness (TFIRE) was formed by Dr. Richard Delauer,
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, to
examine the broader aspects of industrial preparedness
including national planning, availability and stockpiles of
critical materials, and long-term mobilization. The TFIRE
team recommended twelve actions addressing improvement in
the areas of defense, industrial preparedness, and national
base of resources, skilled labor, and productivity. These
actions were referred to as the DOD Industrial Responsive-
ness Improvement Program.
In December 19 81, the DOD Authorization Act of 19 82
was passed and included PL 9 7-86 which repealed the Vinson-
Trammel Act governing profit limitations in shipbuilding.
In his annual posture statement to Congress, Secre-
tary of Defense Weinberger summarized the major problems and
challenges of £he industrial base:
Productivity in Defense supporting industries is
too low. Compared to other business, Defense contracting
is viewed by business as less stable, less predictable,
and thus less attractive than commercial business.
[Ref. 38: p. 191]
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Following the address, Dr. Richard Delauer estab-
lished a tri-service committee, chaired by the U.S. Navy,
to prepare a unified DOD policy on Technology Modernization.
Also, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued an industrial
preparedness policy statement which directed a new policy of
"weaving" industrial base considerations into the acquisition
process and demonstrating to industry that industrial pre-
paredness is an integral part of acquisition. Specifically,
the actions contained in the DOD Acquisition Improvement
Program and eight actions of the DOD Industrial Responsive-
ness Improvement Program constitute DOD ' s effort to "weave"
industrial base considerations into the acquisition process.
8. Summary
The maturing of the DOD-industrial base relation-
ship has been a difficult and painful process. The DOD has
realized that contractors cannot be expected to fully assume
the risks inherent in today's acquisition environment.
The scarcity of resources and growing technological costs
associated with defense acquisitions makes motivation and





A. GOALS OF THE IMIP
The IMIP is based on the theory that improved produc-
tivity in the DIB can be obtained by the application of
capital and technology to the manufacturing process. Under
the auspices of the IMIP, contractors are to be motivated
to make productivity enhancing upgrades to plant and equip-
ment by the elimination of disincentives to investment and
the addition of incentives to make capital improvements.
Two of the disincentives to investment are identified as
the policy of pricing contracts on the basis of costs ex-
pected to be incurred and the application of DAR 3-815 to
severable plant equipment only. Incentives identified are
shared productivity rewards and contractor investment ter-
mination protection.
The primary benefit projected under the IMIP is improved
productivity in the DIB. This improved productivity is ex-
pected to yield more efficient and economical production of
quality end items; improved responsiveness from contractors,
subcontractors, and vendors; and a reduction in acquisition
and life-cycle cost of defense systems. Secondary benefits
anticipated under the IMIP are reduced lead times, an in-
crease in surge and mobilization capability, improved product
reliability, and manufacturing planning based on a long-term
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perspective. This chapter will provide an assessment of
the degree to which the IMIP may be expected to meet the
goals established for it, the potential adverse effects from
the Program, and provide recommendations for consideration
during the test period.
It is recognized that the IMIP is in a test period, the
purpose of which is to learn what works and what does not
work. In that regard, all assessments are directed at the
IMIP as it exists during the test, not the refined IMIP that
will be developed after the test.
B. GOAL ATTAINMENT
The theory of productivity improvement through capital
investment, as discussed in Chapter IV, is well substantiated
in practice. Its application in the IMIP is sound and may
result in improved productivity and reduced unit costs.
Based on the administrative burden it places on government,
it would be useful to analyze the potential scope of the
IMIP. Utilizing the Air Force's F-16 Tech Mod with General
Dynamics as a model, the total savings estimated (both to
government and contractor) was $370 million ($220 million of
which is the government's share) . The capital investment by
General Dynamics amounted to $150 million. The total shared
savings figure is a rough estimate of the increase in pro-
duction efficiency achieved by the capital investment. This
figure assumes many stable parameters such as number of air-
craft to be procured, procurement schedules, and performance
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specifications. In terms of the productivity example in
Chapter IV, this savings theoretically allows the government
to buy more F-16's for the same resources or an equal number
of F-16's at reduced cost due to increased productive effi-
ciency. Due to the shared savings concept, the government
is losing $150 million of the total savings to the contrac-
tor for the purpose of motivating him to implement the capital
improvements
.
The objective of reducing weapon systems cost must ad-
dress unit cost and total acquisition cost considerations.
As noted above, the unit cost of weapon systems might be
reduced due to increased productive efficiency. However,
total acquisition costs are not reduced by the product of
units procured times unit cost savings because of shared
savings. Therefore, although the effect of IMIP will be to
reduce total weapon systems acquisition costs, the amount
by which total costs are reduced will specifically depend
upon the shared savings percentage. In the case of a con-
tractor who negotiated a ninety percent savings share, the
total acquisition cost savings could be nearly negligible.
The presentation of the declining industrial base prob-
lem in Chapter IV highlighted the fact that the decline
is a result of many factors, the main factor being economic.
That is, as in the case of the M60A1 tank turret castings,
the industry began ridding itself of excess capacity to pro-
vide a lean business profile to the extremely harsh economic
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climate of the last decade. It is unrealistic to state that
the IMIP will help reduce this area of industrial base de-
cline. The business trend is clear, the industrial base
will become even leaner as businesses strive to meet competi-
tive and economic pressures. The IMIP will certainly pro-
vide incentives for a changing defense industry to update
its base, but not to the extent of maintaining excess capac-
ity without cost to the government.
The other aspect of the declining industrial base asso-
ciated with the loss of excess capacity is loss of surge
capacity. Surge capacity is the ability to rapidly acceler-
ate production with the existing DIB through the adoption
of a multi-shift, extended work week utilization of existing
production lines and production facilities.
The proposed charter critera of the IMIP test for pro-
gram selection states "The investment should primarily sup-
port enhanced production efficiency of an existing or
anticipated operation, not new production capacity" [Ref. 1:
p. 3]. This "new production capacity" is defined as that
increase in production capacity over and above that reason-
ably expected from the increased efficiency of the new capital
equipment. However, the proposed instruction indicates that
industry should be motivated to "Reduce lead time and in-
crease the surge and mobilization capability of industry"
[Ref. 2: p. 2]
.
There were no programmatic controls established during
the IMIP test period to ensure that surge and mobilization
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capacity are consistently improved when an IMIP is imple-
mented. Therefore, IJMIP's will, in general, not support
new production capacity, and hence surge, which is in con-
sonance with the charter criteria above. However, it should
be noted that the IMIP framework may be used to fund main-
tenance of excess (surge) through shared savings.
There is a general impression that capital equipment
which improves productive efficiency automatically provides
for increased surge capacity. This view is not necessarily
correct and stems from observing efficiency improvement
in terms of time instead of in terms of cost. For example,
two old machines might produce items at a rate of ten per
hour each and a unit cost of $5. Newer machines will gener-
ally be capable of producing items faster, say fifteen per
hour and with more efficiency, say at a reduced unit cost
of $4. The improved capital equipment will be of the latest
technology and most likely will reflect the industrial
movement toward computer aided manufacturing. This capital
equipment requires a much larger initial financial input and
incurs greater amounts of overhead and operating costs. Con-
sequently, companies will attempt to minimize inactive or
down time of the capital equipment. This, in turn, reduces
the limited amount of surge capacity existing in the defense
industrial base.
In the example given above the manufacturer will tend
to buy one fifteen unit per hour capacity machine to replace
110

the two obsolete ten unit per hour capacity machines and
make up the reduced operating capacity by increased opera-
tional shifts and extended lead times. This improves his
efficiency and produces a greater return per time period,
but reduces his "surge" capacity.
Jacques Gansler recognized this phenomenon as major
evidence of the decline in the capability of the defense
industrial base:
Also, the manufacturing equipment that would be
needed for the higher production rates is far more com-
plex to operate and the labor skills required are thus
considerably greater. Finally, this manufacturing
equipment is much more expensive and therefore far less
likely to be sitting around unavailable (much of it is
in three-shift use in peacetime) . [Ref . 39: p. 125]
Recognizing that three-shift operation produces inflexible
production schedules, which are impossible to surge, high-
lights the seriousness of this contributory factor to the
declining DIB.
The other difficulty with improving surge capacity is
in ensuring that a total weapon systems approach to IMIP
implementation is used. A top down factory-wide implementa-
tion of an IMIP to improve surge capacity may not be very
effective in the final analysis if the contractor depends
on other sources for parts or if the contractor is not in-
volved in the production of an entire weapon system. Sporadic
increases in surge capacity across the defense industry
spectrum may improve our overall posture in adjusting to
future military surge requirements but may do nothing for
immediate surge capacity requirements in the short run. For
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example, in the case of the M-l tank, Avco currently cannot
produce engines fast enough to maintain equilibrium with the
completed chassis. This situation certainly reduces the
emphasis required to speed production (i.e., working with
Avco to improve engine manufacture) ; however, the industrial
base does not produce M-l tanks with any greater capacity.
C . ADVANTAGES
The IMIP has two major areas of benefit which require
noting. First, it breaks the bonds of the DOD to the rigid
cost-based profit policy and allows greater flexibility in
dealing with contractors. Secondly, the IMIP is the first
government program which requires specific, measurable im-
provements in the industrial base.
The discussion of the government's cost-base profit
policy in Chapter IV readily illustrates the need for profit
policy reform and the need for flexibility in procurement.
The major inherent motivation in the cost-based profit
policy is to cause contractor emphasis on increased costs
(or a lack of concern for costs in general) to achieve in-
creased profits. It provides no motivation for contractor
efficiency and cost reduction. The IMIP provides a refresh-
ing vehicle by which potential cost savings achieved through
capital investments can improve contractor profits and obtain
contractor commitments to improve their industrial base.
This ability to improve the profit picture of a contractor
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for capital improvements represents an historic step away
from the restrictions of the cost-based profit policy.
An additional advantage of the IMIP is that it provides
more of a mandate for capital improvement by the government
than the present incentives under tax policy. For years,
government has attempted to stimulate the industrial base
toward capital improvements through such tax policies as
depreciation laws and tax credits. These tax policies have
provided the industrial base with incentives to invest but
did not force investment. Tax reductions for industry pro-
vide positive cash flow to "push" consideration of capital
investment but do not provide any mandate to use the tax
saving dollars for capital improvement. Tax credits and
depreciation provide a "pull" for industrial base contrac-
tors to invest in capital equipment but again do not provide
mandates. In both instances, the contractor perceives no
reimbursement for lost profits on DOD contracts due to
reduced costs because of the use of new capital equipment.
The IMIP, on the other hand, is an agreement between the
government and contractor which mandates specific capital
improvements to be installed. The shared savings feature
of IMIP motivates the contractor to make capital investments
in specific areas of the industrial base where it is bene-
ficial to the government.
D. POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES
There are several areas in which it is envisioned that
the IMIP might have an adverse effect. These areas are the
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effect of the IMIP on competition in the acquisition proc-
ess, on the Government's goal of simplifying procurement,
on the acquisition workforce, and the perception that shared
savings represent increased contractor profit.
1. Effect On Competition
The Government, the DOD, and the Navy are taking a
strong interest in increased competition in the procurement
of systems and equipment. White House interest and involve-
ment was expressed by Executive Order 12352, "Federal Pro-
curement Reforms" of 17 March 1982. Section l.(d) of that
order directs the heads of executive agencies engaged in
the procurement of products and services from the private
sector to:
Establish criteria for enhancing effective competition
and limiting noncompetitive actions... [Ref. 40: p. 1]
DOD ' s response to the White House directive was to take a
leadership role in the implementation of the Executive
Order. According to the OUSD:
It may be of further interest that we have taken
significant action under our AIP to simplify the
DOD procurement process and to increase competition.
[Ref. 40: p. 1]
The leadership role of the DOD and Congressional interest
in increased competition was demonstrated by the establish-
ment of the Navy's first Competition Advocate General on
12 July 19 83.
The decision to establish this new position resulted
from the shared concern of Congressman Dan Daniel of
Virginia and Secretary Lehman that competition in the
Navy's procurement process needed to be greatly in-
creased to reduce the cost of equipment acquired by the
Navy. [Ref. 41: p. 43]
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The IMIP will have to be applied in a time of increased
emphasis of competition. This may prove difficult since
IMIP, by making the participating contractor more efficient,
does not encourage competition. Looking at the application
of the IMIP under the different scenarios of a sole source
and in a highly competitive environment demonstrates the
problems faced.
The first scenario entails the award of a contract
incorporating the IMIP on a non-competitive basis. The lack
of competition could mean either that the awardee is the
only contractor capable of producing the product being bought
by the Government (sole source) or that there are other con-
tractors capable of making the product, but for some reason,
for example, a perception that they could not bid competi-
tively, they did not participate in the procurement action.
If in the first case, only the awardee is capable of produc-
ing the product, new contractors will be discouraged from
manufacturing the product due to the improved manufacturing
capability of the awardee. This barrier to entry will ensure
that the sole source situation will be perpetuated. In the
second case of this scenario where there are other manufac-
turers capable of producing the product, but they do not
participate in the bidding process, the result will be the
same. The existence of a modernized, more efficient awardee
could dissuade other contractors from participation since
they see him as more difficult to compete against.
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The second scenario is the IMIP in a highly competi-
tive environment. Under this condition, the IMIP proposal
is to be used in the evaluation of the contractor's bids.
This means that, in addition to the regular criteria for
selection of a contractor (price, delivery time, past per-
formance, etc.), the PCO will also evaluate the IMIP proposal
as an element of the bid. This adds another complexity.
If the award is to be made on the basis of price, will it be
made to the contractor who proposes the lowest cost without
the IMIP projected savings, or to a contractor who proposes
the lowest cost based on the IMIP projected savings? In
this scenario, as the first, the result is the same. The
contractor selected for the award and participation in the
IMIP will become more efficient and more difficult to compete
with on subsequent contracts unless the losing contractors
use their own funds to invest in capital improvements. An
alternative proposed by some individuals involved with the
IMIP test is to rotate, on a to-be-defined basis, IMIP
associated awards among competing contractors. This is intended
to modernize many contractors in a specific field instead of
just one. However, two problems are inherent in the pro-
posed rotation. The first is determining the basis for
selection. Since the most efficient contractor with the
lowest proposed cost (this assumes the benefits of the IMIP
under the previous contract have been achieved) would be the
one which has already participated in the IMIP, the award
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could not be made on a cost basis. The Government would lose
financially if the award were not made on the basis of cost
and would, in fact, be subsidizing the modernization of the
DIB at the taxpayers' expense. The second problem apparent
with rotating awards would be that it might actually result
in lower overall capital investments within the DIB. Con-
tractors, rather than investing their own funds for capital
improvements in out years (not participating in the IMIP)
,
would wait for their turn in the rotation and access to the
IMIP funding.
The two scenarios show that the IMIP is not neces-
sarily counter-competitrve, but that applying it in a
manner that enhances competition will be difficult.
2 . Effect on Acquisition Simplification
The Government has clearly defined its goal of sim-
plifying the procurement process. This objective is demon-
strated by Section l.(a) and 2. of Executive Order 12352,
"Federal Procurement Reforms."
Section 1_. (a) Establish programs to reduce adminis-
trative costs and other burdens which the procurement
function imposes on the Federal Government and the pri-
vate sector. Each program shall take into account the
need to eliminate unnecessary agency procurement regu-
lations, paperwork, reporting requirements, solicitation
provisions, contract clauses, certifications, and other
administrative procedures... and
Section 2_. The Secretary of Defense, the Administrator
of General Services Administration (GSA) , and the Ad-
ministrator for the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA) shall continue their joint efforts
to consolidate their common procurement regulations into
a single simplified Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
by the end of calendar year 19 82. [Ref. 40: p. 2 J
117

The Government is supposed to simplify the procurement proc-
ess through the reduction of administrative burdens, paper-
work and regulations.
The reduction of administrative burdens is currently
being addressed by Task Group Four of the six interagency
task groups formed to develop policy guidance under the
combined leadership of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)
.
The reduction and simplification of acquisition regulations
was led by the OFPP through the publication of the FAR on 19
September 19 83. The FAR, which will become effective on 1
April 19 84, represents a major consolidation and restructur-
ing of the DAR, the Federal Procurement Regulations (FPRl
and NASA Procurement Regulations. It is thus apparent that
the present intent of the Government is to simplify the
procurement process
.
This is the environment into which the multi-phase
IMIP with its requirements for procurement regulation changes,
in-depth technical and financial analysis of contractors,
additional solicitation provisions and contractor selection
criteria, MOUs and MOAs , complex DCFs , and close monitoring
of contractor performance has been thrust. Although it is
not the specific intent of the IMIP to make the acquisition
process more complicated, the needs of the Program definitely
do so
.
Additionally, the conflict between the DOD ' s move
away from its long-standing cost-based profit policy and
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the recent move to simplify the procurement process must
be understood. It was the relative simplicity of the cost-
based profit policy which led to its adoption. It had a
universal application with little consideration for indi-
vidual contractor's needs. This characteristic is the precise
reason the thrust of Federal Procurement Policy has been
away from the cost-based profit policy. The requirements of
the Industrial Base and the Government are being met if the
system is more flexible (i.e., gives more individual recog-
nition to any one contractor than would otherwise have been
the case) . This flexibility expands the amount of regulations
required to define the standard procurement process in each
action, . thus creating a more complex procurement system.
Although it is possible to reduce the administrative schedules
associated with major weapon systems procurement, and achieve
simplification of the weapon systems acquisition process,
it is relatively difficult to reduce any other aspect of the
procurement process without losing accountability or control.
Consideration of this viewpoint and meticulous oversight on
the extent of implementation of these two policies will
be required in the future.
3. Effect On The Procurement Workforce
The DOD procurement workforce is facing some crucial
problems that endanger its ability to complete its mission
in a satisfactory manner. Three of the major problems are:
1. A significant yearly increase in the number and
dollar value of contract actions completed,
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2. Increasing complexity in defense acquisition, and
3. A decline in the quality of the workforce.
The factors listed above are considered to be the major
problems because further increases or decreases in them
could seriously affect the mission capability of the pro-
curement workforce.
The increase in the number and dollar value of con-
tract actions completed is significant. In the period
from FY 1975 to FY 1980, the procurement budget of the DOD
increased from $46 billion to over $83 billion. During the
same time frame, procurement actions of $10,000 or less (small
purchase) only increased from 10,44 0,000 to 11,750,000, but
those over $10,000 (large purchase) increased from 226,690
to 325,170.
A very practical indication -of the significance of
this increase can be seen in these standard processing
time allowances developed at the Defense Industrial
Supply Center.
Small purchase-- . 756 hours
Large purchase— 5.739 hours [Ref. 42: pp. 1-6]
The significance of this increase was recently partially
alleviated by raising the small purchase threshold, but it
is still a meaningful increase. Another crucial increase
occurred in the number of procurement actions over $100,0 00,
a category in which acquisition regulations multiply rapidly.
In this area the number of procurement actions increased
from 31,000 to 55,000 between FY 1975 and FY 1980, an in-
crease of 77 percent. The DOD procurement budget has in-
creased significantly in the past, and under the current
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Administration this trend has continued. On the other hand,
the procurement workforce has historically shown a growth
rate of only about 1.5 percent a year.
The increasing complexity in defense acquisitions
is demonstrated by the new statutory and administrative
requirements that represent a series of incremental increased
demands on the workforce. Some of the legislative and
administrative actions demanding more skill and knowledge
form the workforce in recent years are:
Public Law 95-50 7, an amendment to the Small Business
Act which provides (i) that all purchases subject to
simplified contracting procedures must be set aside for
award to small business firms; and, as a condition to
award of the contract, (ii) that all large business
offerors on contracts in excess of $500,000 agree to
submit and have evaluated plans for subcontracting a
portion of the work to small disadvantaged business
firms
.
The Trade Agreements Act of 19 79, which suspends the
restrictions of the Buy American Act and the Balance of
Payments program for certain products originating in
certain designated countries, thus greatly increasing
the potential for foreign competition and participation
in the acquisition of numerous non-weapon items.
International cooperative agreements for the develop-
ment and production of weapons on a continuing basis.
The adoption of goals for awards to be made pursuant to
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. This section
provides that certain contracts shall be placed with
the Small Business Administration which will then sub-
contract the requirement to a minority-owned firm. P.L.
95-507 gave legislative status to the use of goals, a
practice that had been introduced in the 19 74-75 time
period.
The revision and re-emphasis of OMB * s Circular A-76
dealing with contracting out. This policy guide re-
quires the preparation of work statements and cost esti-





The Office of Federal Procurement Policy's program for
the acquisition and distribution of commercial prod-
ucts. This program introduces an element of uncertainty
as to the adequacy of a product to meet a given require-
ment which must be compensated for by appropriate con-
tractual protections. [Ref. 42: pp. 1-8]
The quality or skill levels of DOD contract special-
ists in the workforce is generally measured by length of
service. Two other measurement methods are the separation
rate of personnel classified in the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) occupational series GS-1102 entitled "Con-
tract and Procurement" and the educational attainments of
newly appointed contracting officers. By all of these
measurements the quality of the workforce is declining.
A decline in length of service is shown in the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Report 1M5391 of 23 March 1981.
According to the Report, the average years of service for
GS-1102 series personnel declined between the years 1975
and 1981 by approximately 15 percent in the Army, 15 percent
in the Navy, 3 percent in the Air Force, and 2 percent in the
DLA. An increase of personnel in the GS-1102 series during
the same period from approximately 12,000 to 14,000 partially
accounts for the overall DOD decrease of 8 percent in length
of service, but there are numerous other factors. Of
these, only the increase in separation rates will be addressed
The increase in the separation rates for GS-1102
series is generally viewed as a factor regarding the decrease
,
in the average years of service. According to the DMDC Report
1M5391, the separation rate for personnel in the GS-1102
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series between the years 1975 and 1981 increased by 30 per-
cent in the Army, 2 percent in the Navy, 60 percent in the
Air Force, and 72 percent in the DLA. A lack of positive
correlation between the decline in average years of service
and the increase in the rate of separations is apparent.
It could indicate that those services with the highest rates
of separation, such as the DLA, are also the agencies that
are able to attract experienced personnel (measured by
average years of service) . The bottom line is that the
overall DOD rate of separation increased by 4 percent during
the period with the primary cause cited as a basis for separa-
tion being the pressure resulting from a heavy workload and
the ever-increasing regulations.
The final measure of quality in the DOD workforce
is the educational attainment of newly appointed contracting
officers. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO)
this is also declining:
Over the past two or three years, the quality of the
procurement work force has been declining in both the
civil and defense agencies. This is evidenced by lower
educational attainments among newly appointed contract-
ing officers, difficulties in filling agency intern
programs with qualified candidates, and complaints from
procurement officers about the lack of skills of new
personnel
.
An example is provided by the Office of Personnel Man-
agement's Central Personnel Data File. It shows a 7.2
percent drop in the number of college graduates entering
the Contracting Officer (1102) series...
[Ref. 42: p. 16]
The procurement workforce is facing an increasing
workload, more complex regulations, and a decline in the
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quality of its personnel. Under these conditions, the IMIP
cannot help but have an adverse effect on the workforce:
the IMIP will not reduce the number of contracts and will
actually add steps to each one (Phase I, II, and III); it
brings with it an entire new set of complex regulations in
the form of an instruction, a guide and DAR clauses; and it
could result in a further decline in workforce quality due





The contractor's portion of shared savings may be
viewed by some concerned parties as additional profit when
it exceeds the value of the contractor's capital investment.
This misconception of shared savings as excessive profit
rather than a reasonable ROI could have the adverse effect
of eroding some support for the IMIP in parties concerned
with cost reductions.
5 Summary
It is thus apparent that potential adverse effects
of the IMIP are significant: in an era of increased emphasis
on competition, it will be difficult to operate the Program
to enhance competition and it might actually be counter-
productive; it will bring increased complexity to the acqui-
sition process at a time when a major effort is underway to
make the process simpler; it represents added regulations,
analysis, and procurement steps for an already overtaxed
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acquisition workforce; and its shared savings concept might
be viewed as excessive profits for contractors.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has presented an analysis of the IMIP and a
review of its historical elements. Based on that analysis,
the following recommendations are presented:
1. To continue the test for a reasonable period of time
with the goal of reaching a joint consensus of the
final forms for the IMIP regulations and DAR changes.
2. To issue a policy statement or establish an authority
to ensure that there is a minimum of conflict between
the IMIP and increased competition.
3. To determine, prior to committing the DOD to the
full-scale Program, the capability of the acquisi-
tion workforce to absorb an increase in its workload.
4. To officially recognize the fact that the IMIP is a
small scale exception to the acquisition simplifica-
tion program.
5. To clarify and emphasize the fact that shared savings
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Whereas, Naval Sea Systems Command is desirous of entering
into an agreement with General Dynamics, Pomona Division and
its subcontractor, Thiokol Coryoration, for the purpose of
improving industrial technology and reducing costs of the
Standard Missile MR MK-104 DTRM program under the Industrial
Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP) and,
Whereas, General Dynamics, Pomona Division and its subcon-
tractor, Thiokol Corporation, desire to participate in the
IMIP,
Therefore, it is agreed that the IMIP shall be conducted
within the guidelines and conditions as set forth in this
Agreement.
General Dynamics, as long as it is the prime contractor for
the MK 104 Dual Thrust Rocket Motor, will manage, monitor,
audit and maintain overall cognizance over the incorporation
of up to approximately seven million dollars ($7,000,000)
of improvements to facilities by Thiokol, including new
equipment and engineering management applications, to im-
prove overall productivity through advanced technologies
which will reduce the production costs of the MK-104 Dual
Thrust Rocket Motor. The principal manufacturing and .
management systems to be covered are:
Nozzle Fabrication
Insulation, fabrication and case preparation
Cast/cure/core pop/x-ray
Final assembly
Propellant materials preparation and mixing
Igniter fabrication and ignition system assembly





Tool sustenance and periodic inspection
Product oriented mode or operation
Naval Sea System Command will provide the opportunity for
Thiokol Corporation to recoup its investment and a reason-
able return thereon, through shared savings based upon
baseline prices to be negotiated.
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Nothing in this MOU shall be construed as precluding the
Naval Sea Systems Command from purchasing its MK 104 DTRM
requirements, for the fiscal years 19 85 and beyond, directly
from Thiokol, in which event all General Dynamics IMIP
responsibilities referred to in this MOU shall cease for
said requirements.
The parties agree to negotiate an IMIP in accordance with
NAVMAT Notice 5000, DODI-5000.XX and the following:
a. The Thiokol total investment covered under this
agreement shall not exceed $7,000,000.
b. Shared savings are defined as the cost reductions
that are generated from the productivity enhancing
investments and engineering management applications
which will reduce the cost of MK 104 DTRM.
c. If NAVSEA should complete the production of MK 104
motors during the course of the IMIP contract and
Thiokol should lose the competition, the IMIP con-
tract shall be terminated. In such an event Thiokol
shall be indemnified in accordance with the ter-
mination provisions of DODI 5000. XX for the unrecovered
depreciation for those severable facility items
requested by Thiokol which are mutually agreed to
be excess to Thiokol' s known requirements.
d. In the event termination protection is provided in
accordance with DODI-5000.XX the following not-to-
exceed amount of government liability to Thiokol
by Government FY in which the termination occurs
shall govern.





e. The estimated baseline unit prices for computation
of savings for the MK 10 4 Dual Thrust Rocket Motor
for the minimum quantity of motors delivered (includ-
ing the price for lot acceptance test and verification
motors), by Government fiscal year contract, shall
not exceed the following:
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Unit Price Min Deliverable Qty
GFY 83 $369,700 30
GFY 84 163,548 390
GFY 85 155,778 475
GFY 86 139,797 830
If an adjustment in deliverable quantities is made,
an adjustment to the unit price will be made.
f. It is agreed, by the parties hereto, to enter into
negotiations within 120 days to establish the
specific terms for implementation of this agreement.
g. The Government shall not incur any liability or
obligation for work performed prior to the execution
of this agreement.
Upon execution of this agreement, which shall become effec-
tive upon the signature of all three parties, Thiokol shall
promptly proceed to implement the IMIP program in recognition
of the intent of having the improvements in place for the
processing of FY83 MK-104 motors, provided that , if an IMIP
agreement is not executed NAVSEA shall incur no liability
to either General Dynamics or Thiokol and General Dynamics




SOURCES OF GROWTH OF REAL GROSS PRODUCT
U.S. domestic business economy, sources of growth of real








Changes in rate of dif.





Changes in quality of land
Resource reallocations
Self-employment to emp. .1
Interindustry labor shifts .4 .1
Weighting effects -.2
















Economies of scale .5 .3
Intensity of demand .1 -.5
Irregular factors
Net gov. impact - -
1
Gov. services to business .1 .1
Business services to gov. -.1 -.2
Residual factors, n.e.c. - .1
Source: John W. Kendrick, "Total Investment and Produc-
tivity Developments," paper prepared for a joint session of
the American Economic and Finance Associations, New York,
December 30, 1977 (available on request to the author),
based for the 19 48-66 period mainly on estimates from Edward
F. Denison, Accounting for United States Economic Growth,





FREE MARKET—DEFENSE MARKET COMPARISON




All items small, perfectly divi-
sible, and in large quantities.
Market sets prices.
Free movement in and out of
market.
Prices set by marginal costs.
Prices set by marginal utility.
Prices fall with reduced demand.
Supply adjusts to demand.
Labor highly mobile.
Decreasing or constant returns
to scale.
Market shifts rapidly to changes




Very few, large suppliers of a given
item.
One ship built every few years, for
hundreds of millions of dollars each.
Monopoly or oligopoly priciing—or
"buy in" to "available" dollars.
Extensive barriers to entry and
exit.
Prices proportional to total costs.
Any price paid for the desired mili-
tary performance.
Prices rise with reduced demand.
Large excess capacity.
Greatly diminishing labor mobility.
Increasing returns to scale in region
of interest.
7-10 years to develop a new system, then
305 years to produce it.
Market smoothly reaches equilib. Erratic behavior from year to year.
General equilibrium—assumes
prices will return to their
equilibrium value.
Profits equalized across the
economy.
Perfect mobility of capital
(money) .
Mobility of capital (equipment)
to changing demand.
Costs have been rising at approximately
5% per year (excluding inflation)
.
Wide and consistent profit variations
between sectors; even wider between firms.
Heavy debt, difficulty in borrowing.





Selection based on price.
No externalities.
Government is regulator, specifier,
banker, judge of claims, etc.
Selection often based on politics,
or sole source, or "negotiation";
only 8% of dollars awarded on price
competition.
All businesses working for DoD must
satisfy requirements of OSHA, EEO,
awards to areas of high unemployment,
small business set-aides, etc.
Prices fixed by market.
All products of a given type
are the same.
Most business, with any risk, is
for "cost plus fee .
"
Essentially, each producer's products
are different.
Competition is for share of
market.
Production is for inventory.
Size of market established by the
buyers and sellers.
Demand sensitive to price.
Competition is frequently for all
or none of a given market.
Production occurs after sale is made.
Size of market established by "third
party" (Congress) through annual
budget.
Demand "threat "-sensitive, or
responds to availability of new






Benefits of the purchase go
to the buyer.
Buyer has the choice of spend-
ing now or saving for a later
purchase.
Competitive technologies.
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